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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral finance has been gathering more and more attention in the last decade, and both 
academia and practitioners have slowly starting to accept that psychology influence financial 
markets. Even though markets are irrational, old theories like CAPM, fundamental analysis 
and modern portfolio theory is still widely used. Given the amount of research regarding 
behavioral finance, is it impossible to give a complete summary of the entire field, hence, this 
study presents a brief review of the most relevant theories in order to give the reader an 
introduction to behavioral finance. 
With the increased attention to behavioral finance, mutual funds seems to incorporate 
different filters to capture irrational behavioral, and to capitalize on irrational investors. The 
objective of this study is to evaluate the performance of “behavioral” mutual funds, and to 
compare their performance to index funds and non-behavioral funds. However, none of the 
funds in the Norwegian market explicitly admits make investments based on behavioral 
finance. The selection of funds is therefore based on a detailed and comprehensive review of 
67 prospectuses of Norwegian funds, published on the Morningstar and the fund manager’s 
website, is done in order to familiarize behavioral mutual funds in the Norwegian market. 
Empirical analysis is further applied, where a test for abnormal performance for six mutual 
funds identified as behavioral in the Norwegian market is conducted. Further analysis is also 
performed in order to recognize the strategy approach of the tested behavioral funds. 
The empirical results indicate that behavioral funds are able to outperform index funds and 
non-behavioral funds. The results further indicated that behavioral funds are tilted towards 
value investing, but fail to earn risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Given the difficulties of 
identifying behavioral funds in the Norwegian market, it is problematic to draw any strong 
conclusions from this study, but the results indicate that recognizing behavioral inefficiency 
may improve the performance of mutual funds. 
 
 
Keywords: behavioral finance, behavioral mutual funds, market inefficiency, fund 
performance analysis 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade behavioral finance has gathered more and more attention. Both academia 
and practitioners are starting to accept that investors do not always make rational choices 
when making investments. Throughout time behavioral finance has been defined in a 
numerous ways. Barber and Odean (1998) defined behavioral finance as the human departure 
from rationality and to incorporate this behavior into standard models of financial markets. 
Sewell (2007) defines behavioral finance as the influence of psychology in the financial 
market and how this might explain why the market is inefficient.  
If irrational investors are present in the market and the market is inefficient, one could expect 
mutual funds to outperform the market. However, most studies of mutual fund performance 
conclude that active managed mutual funds are not able to generate abnormal returns (Jensen, 
1968; Wermers, 2000). To further expand the research on fund performance and the practical 
application of behavioral finance, this study examines if mutual funds can benefit from 
behavioral finance.  
Mutual funds that that explicit applies a behavioral strategy approach may be categorized as 
behavioral. However, defining what makes a mutual fund “behavioral” is difficult, and 
involves some subjectivity. Wright et al. (2006) define behavioral mutual funds as funds that 
“claims to base their investment strategies on principles of behavioral finance in order to 
capitalize on market inefficiencies and earn above average returns” (Wright et al., 2006).  
There are two main international studies of behavioral mutual fund performance, and these 
studies have found similar results: Reinhart and Brennan (2007) found that behavioral funds 
were able to outperform index funds and their respective Morningstar and Lipper indices. 
Wright et al. build further on the work of Reinhart and Brennan by adding more funds to the 
data sample and by using a multifactor risk model, in order to evaluate the funds performance. 
Their results indicate that behavioral mutual funds are able to attract investment dollars, 
outperform index funds, but have not been able to deliver risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
Due to the lack of earlier studies concerning behavioral finance in the Norwegian market, the 
purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the performance of behavioral funds in the 
Norwegian market. The funds are identified after a comprehensive review of 67 Norwegian 
mutual funds using their prospectuses published on Morningstar, and examining the 
investment philosophy of the funds management company. However, none of the funds in the 
Norwegian market explicitly admits make investments based on behavioral finance, which 
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caused the categorization to be difficult. The analysis is conducted to examine whether 
behavioral mutual funds (1) earn abnormal returns after controlling for risk and (2) have 
different factor loading in the Carhart four-factor model compared to non-behavioral funds. 
The Norwegian behavioral mutual funds included in this study are Skagen Vekst, Pareto 
Aksje Norge, Delphi Norge, Pluss Aksje, Holberg Norge and Odin Norge.  
The study starts with a general test for abnormal performance. After the test for abnormal 
performance, each funds is ranked using Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio in order to 
analyze their ability to outperform the market and index funds. To further compare the funds 
associated with behavioral finance against traditional active managed funds, two equally 
weighted portfolios are created and tested using the same measurements. 
I expect my empirical result to support the finding of Reinhart and Brennan (2007) and 
Wright et al (2006), that behavioral mutual funds in the Norwegian market outperform index 
funds and non-behavioral funds, but being unable to generate risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
The empirical results confirm my expectations, that behavioral funds are unable to generate 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns. My finding also indicates that the funds are able to outperform 
index funds. Additionally, the result indicates that behavioral fund seems to be more tilted 
towards value investing than non-behavioral funds. 
Similar to Wright et al., I would emphasize the difficulties of identifying behavioral funds. 
However, the funds included in this study are the funds with the strongest characteristics 
towards a behavioral strategy.   
 
1.1 HYPOTHESIS 
The main objective of this study is to determine: (1) If Norwegian behavioral mutual funds 
can earn positive abnormal returns and (2) try to gain insight in the strategy the funds follows 
by analyzing the factor loadings in the Carhart four-factor model. 
The following hypothesis is formed in order to evaluate the objective of the study: 
H1: Behavioral mutual funds earn zero abnormal returns after controlling for risk. 
H2: Behavioral mutual funds load differently than conventional mutual fund on the Fama and 
French (1992) and Carhart (1997) factor portfolios. 
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The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides the theoretical 
background for the rational approach of asset pricing and can be seen as a review of the most 
relevant literature. Section three introduces behavioral finance as an alternative theory to the 
rational approach. Section four contains a short summary of studies evaluating mutual fund 
investing and performance. Section five describes the data used in the empirical testing, while 
section six lays out the results of the testing. Section seven contains the concluding remarks. 
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2.0 THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO ASSET PRICING 
In Section 2.1 the efficient market hypothesis is introduces, and the basic literature is 
reviewed. Section 2.2 and 2.3 introduce the capital asset price model and the arbitrage pricing 
theory. Section 2.4 and section 2.5 explains the notion behind the multifactor models of Fama 
and French (1992) and Carhart (1997). In section 2.6 the implication of efficient markets for 
portfolio management is discussed. 
 
2.1 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is today the most used and well-respected theory for 
estimating future stock prices. Ever since Eugene Fama published his “Random Walks in 
Stock Market Prices” in 1965, the theory has been one of the building blocks in traditional 
finance, and is thought in all introductory finance class.  
Fama (1965) defines an efficient market as “a market where there are large numbers of 
rational profit maximizes actively competing, with each other trying to predict future market 
values of individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely 
available to all participants”. This indicates that competition is free, and every participant is 
the market is trying to profit as much as possible. Efficient markets also imply that prediction 
of future stock prices is impossible, as they follow a random walk.  
According to Samuelson (1965) the information available in the market, makes up a set of 
three efficient-levels:  
• Week form efficiency: Stock prices reflect historical prices and other financial data. 
Future stock price move according to a random walk, and any mispricing in the market 
will be eliminated the second they are observed by competing investors. Under this 
efficiency, technical analysis will not work, since all historical information is useless. 
• Semi-strong efficiency: In this form for efficiency, all public information is reflected 
in the stock price. This implies that both technical and fundamental analysis will be 
useless. Under this efficient the only way to create excess returns is either by luck or 
inside information.  
• Strong efficiency: Stock prices reflect all information, both public information and 
inside information. Under this efficiency it is not possible to create excess return.    
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In an efficient market both information- and transactions costs are not considered relevant. 
While Jensen (1979) argue that profitable trade would be made until the cost of transaction 
and information is equal to the margin cost, Fama (1991) finds it more relevant to test for 
efficiency without any considering any costs. 
The paradox of the efficient market hypothesis is that if every investor believes the market is 
efficient, the market would not be efficient. In this case no one would be analyzing securities 
in the search for undervalued securities. The market need investors in search for information 
and undervalues securities in order to stay efficient. This also implies that the information in 
stock analysis forms the basis for the “right” market price (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; Reizer, 
2010).  
The level of efficiency in the market is still a topic under discussion. Studies show a semi-
strong market both in the US and in Norway, and this is supportive to the expectations 
considering that new technology enables investors to gather and process all information in the 
market rather quickly. Studies of fund performance can also be used to test the level of 
efficient. Both Gjerde and Sættem (1991) and Sørensen (2009) found active managed funds 
not being able to earn abnormal returns, indicating at least a semi-strong efficiency in the 
Norwegian market. 
 
2.2 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
The capital asset pricing model, (CAPM), was developed by William Sharpe (1964), John 
Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966), and build on the work about modern portfolio theory 
published by Harry Markowitz (1952). The model gives a prediction of the return and 
systematic risk of a portfolio, and could be used to provide a benchmark for evaluation 
investments and to make an educated guess about expected returns. CAPM suggests that the 
optimal portfolio for a mean-variance optimizing investor, is a combination of the risk-free 
asset and the market portfolio (Bodie et al., 2008).   
The CAPM is built up on six strict assumptions, and under these assumptions most of the 
complexity regarding the market is ignored: 
1. The market consists of many investors, all with a small wealth compared to the 
market. All investors are considered to be price takers.  
2. All investors plan for only one time horizon, indicating they are shortsighted.  
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3. The investor can choose between all publicly traded financial assets and risk-free 
borrowing and lending.  
4. All investor are rational, mean-variance optimizers. 
5. The investors pay no taxes on returns and no transaction costs on trades in securities. 
6. Investors have homogeneous expectations about securities and the market.  
 
The model is defined as:   
 !(!!) =   !! + !! ∗ E(!!)− !!  (1) 
where !(!!) = Expected return on the portfolio !! = Risk-free interest rate E(!!) = Expected return on market E(!!)− !! = Expected market risk premium !! = Portfolio beta (systematic risk) 
 
To capture movement in the portfolio relative to the market, beta is introduced. Beta is the 
sensitivity of the excess return of the portfolio, relative to the expected excess return on the 
market, and defined as: 
 
 !! = !"#(!!, !!)!!!  (2) 
 
where !"#(!!, !!) = Covariance between return on the portfolio, and return on the market. !!!  = Variance of the market. 
 
The market portfolio has a β of 1, and if portfolio has a β higher (lower) than 1 the portfolio 
will fluctuate more (less) than the market portfolio. The CAPM considers only systematic risk 
and not unsystematic risk related to companies, due to the assumption about all investor being 
well diversified. 
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The risk related to the return on securities is measured trough standard deviation, which is 
calculated as average difference from the average return. A security with volatile returns 
holds a high standard deviation relative to a less volatile security. When analyzing fund 
performance, standard deviation can be used in order to test the performance of the fund 
manager. A fund with high returns can hold a high standard deviation and thereby not yield 
any better risk-adjusted returns, since the high returns are directly related to high risk.  
The standard deviation of a mutual fund is referred to as the total risk, and can be divided in 
systematic and nonsystematic risk (Bodie, et al., 2008). 
Total risk is defined as: 
 
 !! =   !! ∗ !! + !! (3) 
where !! = Total Risk, Variance of the portfolio !!!! = Systematic risk  !! = Nonsystematic risk 
   
The systematic risk is related to the aggregate market and thereby referred to as market-risk or 
undiversified risk. Since the systematic risk represents the correlation between return on the 
market index and return on the portfolio, the systematic risk cannot be mitigated through 
diversification. A major part of the systematic risk is related to news and events on a macro 
level. Changes in oil prices, political issues, and interest-rates are factors contributing to 
fluctuation in the systematic risk (Wittrup, 2008). One recent example of increase in 
systematic risk is the financial crisis in 2008, which lead to stock markets plummeting and 
interest rates being driven up. This caused the value of both securities and funds to fall 
sharply. 
The unsystematic risk is the risk a fund is accepting when moving away from the market 
portfolio. Unsystematic risk often referred to as firm-specific risk or diversifiable risk, as 
holding a well-diversified portfolio removes all unsystematic risk. In active fund management 
where stock picking is used, the fund is accepting risk on a micro level. This may be financial 
distress, strike, production problems or any other risk uncorrelated with the aggregate market 
risk. The market portfolio holds no unsystematic risk, since all securities are included in the 
market portfolio. 
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To lower the total risk in the portfolio the investor or fund manager can use diversification. 
Markowitz (1952) showed that, as long as stocks fluctuate differently, including more stocks 
would lower the total risk of the portfolio. Statman (1987) found that a well-diversified 
portfolio consist of a least 30 stocks.  
By reformulating the CAPM into an index model, it can be used to test historical realizes 
return relative to expected returns.  
The single index model is the defined as: 
 
 !!! − !!! = !!! + !! !!! − !!! + !!! (4) 
where  
 
 
 
 
 
The single-index model can be estimated using a regression model. Historical observations 
are used in order explain the linear relation between market return and return on the portfolio. 
By using the single-index this way, the model is assuming that previous performance is equal 
to the expected return. 
This regression analysis is based on the principle of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This 
method minimizes the sum of the residuals by minimizing the distance between the estimated 
regression line and the historical observations on the dependent variable (Greene, 2008). !! is 
the regression-coefficient and explains how much a marginal change in the independent 
variable, the market portfolio, would change the depended variable holding all other variable 
constant. The !! in CAPM measures how close the portfolio follows movements in the 
market. α is the intercept of the regression, and explain the abnormal performance. This will 
be further discusses in section 2.7.2 as Jensen’s alpha. 
The error term !! holds a variance of zero, and is a measurement of the unsystematic risk 
related to the model. The error term captures the variation in the dependent variable, which is 
!!! = Realized return on portfolio p, in time period t. !!! = Risk-free interest rate at time period t !!! = Realized abnormal return in time period t !!! − !!!  = Realized market premium in time period t. !!! = Residual returns 
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not explained by the independent variables. Variations such as wrong measurement, wrong 
independent variables or outliers in the observations, could influence the error term. 
To determine if the model produces statistical significant regression coefficients, a standard t-
test may be applied. T-values are computed by dividing the estimated regression coefficient 
over standard error. As a general rule, the t-value for a 95% confidence interval should not 
exceed a critical absolute value of 1.96. If the t-values exceed the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is rejected since the values estimated by the model does not hold as statistical 
significant. When testing for abnormal performance, the following hypotheses are formed: !!:! = 0  !!:! ≠ 0  
If the t-value for an alpha test exceeds 1.96 the variable is found to be different from zero at a 
5 % significant level. 
 
 
2.3 ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY 
An alternative model to describe the returns of securities is the arbitrage pricing theory (ATP) 
developed by Stephen Ross (1976). The theory relies on three propositions: First, a factor 
model can be used to describe returns on securities. Second, the market consists of enough 
securities to diversify away all nonsystematic risk. Third, well functioning security market 
does not allow arbitrage opportunities to persist.  
By dividing the risk in the security in macro events and company specific events, a 
multifactor model can be derived. The argument behind the model is that different macro 
events in the business cycle might affect expected stock return. By introducing factor 
portfolios for each of the different systematic risk factors, the model can be used to analyze 
how each of the risk factors affects the stock returns. Factor portfolios are well-diversified 
portfolios constructed to have a beta of 1 to the specific systematic risk factor and beta of 0 to 
all other risk factors. Common risk factors in the model are oil price, inflation rates 
fluctuation, GDP and industrial production. Each risk factor has an excepted value of zero, 
which indicates that the level is irrelevant, and only changes in the level are considered to be a 
risk factor. 
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The multifactor APT can be defined as:   
 !! = ! !! + !!!!! + !!!!! +⋯+ !!"!! + !! (5) 
 
where !! = Return on the portfolio ! !!  = Expected return on the portfolio !!" = Factor loadings !! = Factor portfolios 
 
The APT has less strict assumptions than CAPM and can be regarded as more robust model. 
In contrast to the CAPM, the APT makes no explicit assumptions about investors’ utility 
function and does not consider an unobservable market portfolio. As mention earlier, the 
model also uses factor portfolios to track the sensitivity of returns relative to common risk 
factors. The model further implies that any arbitrage opportunity in the market will be 
exploited, and a violation of the APT would cause extreme pressure to restore equilibrium.  
As the APT assumes both frictionless and competitive markets, the practical application of the 
theory has been widely discussed. Frictionless markets means no transaction cost, while a 
competitive markets is referring to a market where buyer and sellers can trade unlimited 
quantities of the security without changing the price of the security. Relaxing these 
assumptions makes the theory more practical useful, but also introduce the notion of liquidity 
risk. Studies have found the liquidity risk makes the “correct” price under APT into an 
arbitrage-free interval rather than one specific arbitrage-free price.  
One practical application of APT is style investing. By creating factor portfolios on certain 
areas in the market, it is possible to sell different investments styles to the investor. One 
company who sell such styles is Dimensional Fund Advisors. They offer the opportunity to 
investing in factor portfolios like SMB or HML (Bodie, et al., 2008; Cetin et al., 2004). 
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2.4 FAMA-FRENCH THREE FACTOR MODEL 
In 1992 Eugene Fama and Kenneth French extended the CAPM. By analyzing stocks on 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ they observed that stock with small capitalization earned 
higher average return than stock with large capitalization, and similar, stocks with high book-
to-market ratio would earn higher average returns than stocks with low book-to-market ratio. 
Their results indicates that stock returns are multidimensional, and to better explain the 
variations in stock prices caused by these cross-sectional returns in the market, they added 
two risk factors to CAPM. To capture the risk-reward related to firm size, they added the 
SMB factor, and for the book-to-market ratio the HML factor was added.  
The Fama-French model is defined as: 
 
 !! − !! = !! + !!!"#! + !!!"# + ℎ!!"# + !! (6) 
SMB is the risk factor related to firm size, and stands for small minus big. Fama and French 
construct this factor by creating two portfolios, one of the smallest 30% of the stocks and one 
of the largest 30%. The SMB factor is then calculated by subtracting the average return of the 
portfolio consisting of large stocks from the average return of the portfolio consisting of small 
stocks. A positive (negative) SMB-factor indicates that small-capitalized stocks have 
overperformed (underperformed) relative to large capitalized stocks.  The SMB factor is 
added to address the risk related to less liquidity and the less ability of small stocks to absorb 
negative financial events (Barberis et al., 1998) 
The factor HML is added to capture the risk related to book-to-market ratio. Fama and French 
created this factor by sorting all stock by their book-to-market ratio. Then they created two 
portfolios by dividing stocks in two portfolios: value stocks with high book-to-market ratio 
and growth stock with low book-to-market ratio. The HML factor is then calculated as the 
average return of value stocks, minus the average return of the growth stock. A positive 
(negative) HML factor indicated that value stocks have overperformed (underperformed) 
relative to growth stocks. The HML factor is added as a risk factor to capture the risk related 
to beliefs about future earnings or financial distress (Barberis, et al., 1998; K. C. Chan & 
Chen, 1991). 
The model explains the relationship between risk-reward and thus ads support to hypothesis 
about efficient market. Fama and French argue that the return on a security is only a result of 
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exposure to different risk factors, and this indicates that investors are not able to generate 
abnormal return. Any investor claiming this ability, has only adjusted the relative factor 
loading, and accepted the risk involved (Fama & French, 1992). 
 
2.5 CARHART’S FOUR-FACTOR MODEL  
To explain even more of the variability in the return on a portfolio, a third factor is added to 
CAPM. Hendricks et al. (1993) introduced the term “hot hands” by studying the short-time 
persistence in mutual funds performance. Their result indicates that selecting among the top 
performers based on the results last four quarter could outperform the average mutual funds. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) further studies the returns of stocks, and discovered the prior 
one-year momentum anomaly. This anomaly indicated that prior winners continue to 
outperform prior losers with an average of about 1% per month. Jeagdeesh and Titman (1993) 
attributes this different to the fact that investors react slow to new information. The result of 
Carhart (1997) indicates that the momentum anomaly in stock returns leads to the 
phenomenon of hot hands in mutual funds performance. To better capture this anomaly, 
Carhart added the prior-one-year-momentum factor to the Fama and French (1992) three-
factor model in order to examine portfolio performance. The PR1YR is constructed ”as the 
equal-weight average of firms with the highest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one 
month minus the equal-weight average of firms with the lowest 30 percent eleven-month 
returns lagged one month” (Carhart, 1997). The model can also be interpreted as a 
performance attribution model, where the coefficients on factor portfolios attributes for four 
strategies: High versus low beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization stocks, value 
versus growth stocks and one-year momentum versus contrarian stocks.  
The Carhart four-factor model is defined as:  
 !! −   !! = !! + !!!"!# + !!!"# + ℎ!!"# + ℎ!!"1!" + !! (7) 
SMB, HML and PR1YR are returns on the factor portfolios related to size, book-to-market 
ratio and momentum. 
Carhart finds certain persistence in mutual fund performance, but most of the funds 
underperform relative to the index. This is in line with earlier studies indicating that active 
portfolio management is not able to deliver abnormal return above the market (Burton, 1995; 
Fama & French, 1992; Wermers, 2000). The results of Carhart also indicate that following a 
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momentum strategy earn significantly lower abnormal returns after transaction expenses. He 
suggests that transactions cost consume the gains from the momentum strategy. Carhart 
further finds that four-factor model being able to eliminate almost all of the pricing error, 
meaning that it well “describes the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns”. He 
further lists three rules for investors; first, avoid funds with persistent bad performance. 
Second, only one-year persistence can be observed. Third, costs have direct negative impact 
on the performance of the funds (Carhart, 1997). 
 
2.6 IMPLICATION FOR PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
Under the rational approach to asset pricing, combining the market portfolio with a risk-free 
asset achieves the best risk-adjusted returns. This means that both risk loving and risk-averse 
investor should consider investing in passive managed funds, since the fund will follow the 
movement of the market portfolio, and thus, in combination with a risk-free alternative, 
generate the best risk-adjusted return (Bodie, et al., 2008). 
A passive managed fund tries to replicate an index, and is often called an index fund. To 
implement the strategy, the fund manager invests in all the companies in an index, and 
rebalances the portfolio only when changes are done to the index. Each company is given the 
same weight in the portfolio, as in the index, and the return on the fund will follow the return 
on the index and not try to outperform it. The fund manager only replicates the index, 
indicating that stock picking and analysis is eliminated, reducing the holding cost on index 
funds. With only limited changes in the index, an index fund will be relative cheaper to hold 
compared to an active managed fund. The index fund should be appealing to investors who 
are skeptical about fund managers’ ability to outperform the market, and to those who would 
like to minimize the transaction costs.  
In Norway only a few index fund are available to investors, but the number of available index 
funds are increasing steadily. In addition to the traditional index funds sold direct from fund 
companies to investors, it is also possible to buy index funds directly on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. These funds are called Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and traded similar to stocks. 
Since ETFs are traded throughout the day, prices are available at any time, and the investor 
has no costs related to buying and selling, other than the normal fee to the broker as similar to 
stocks.  
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2.6.1 PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Even though the CAPM and the efficient market hypothesis suggest that the best risk-reward 
is achieved by combing the risk-free asset and the market portfolio, there are still many fund 
managers trying to outperform the market. This is done through active management of the 
funds. To test the ability of the fund manager to achieve a better risk-reward performance, 
three different performance measurements are introduced. In this section Jensen’s alpha, 
Sharpe Ratio and Information are introduced to give a better understanding of portfolio 
performance. 
 
2.6.2 JENSEN ALPHA 
Jensen (1967) developed a risk-adjusted measurement to test the ability of fund managers to 
earn returns higher than expected by the CAPM, given the β of the portfolio and the return on 
the market.  
Jensen’s alpha is defined as:  
 !! = !(!!)− !! + !! !(!!)− !!  (8) 
In this model the alpha,  !!, represents the abnormal return above the return expected from 
CAPM. Under CAPM, the investor is expected to receive   !! = 0  and the only factor 
contributing to increased expected return above the risk-free interest rate, is the systematic 
risk !!. Jensen’s alpha can also be computed using a multiple factor model such as Fama and 
French (1992) or the Carhart (1997) model. 
Since Jensen’s alpha is an absolute measure of performance, a positive alpha would indicate 
that the portfolio has outperformed the market on a risk-adjusted basis. A negative alpha 
indicated that the portfolio did worse than the market, after adjusting for risk.  
Under active fund management, the manager tries to identify securities that yield returns 
above the security market line, earn excess returns. In this context Jensen’s alpha can be used 
as a measure of the success of the portfolio manager  
The model assumes a constant beta-value and a constant risk-free rate. However, a constant 
beta is problematic due to shifts in the portfolio. Further, the use of a risk-free rate is 
problematic since there is no “official” risk-free rate. Since Jensen’s alpha measure 
performance relative to a market index, selection of benchmark index can also influence the 
result. 
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2.6.3 SHARPE’S RATIO 
Introduced by William Sharpe in 1966, the Sharpe Ratio is used as a “reward-to-variability 
ratio” to measure performance of mutual funds.  
The ratio is created to measure excess return per each unit of total risk in the portfolio. This 
way the Sharp’s Ratio can be used to check if a fund return is due to smart decisions or a 
result of excess risk. The Sharpe Ratio produces arbitrary values and can only be uses as a 
way to rank the performance of different portfolios.  
Sharpe’s ratio is defined as: 
 
 !! = !! − !!!!  (9) 
where !! = Sharpe Ratio !! = Portfolio return  !! = Risk-free rate !! = Standard deviation of the portfolio 
 
2.6.4 INFORMATION RATIO 
Information Ratio (IR) is used as a measure of abnormal returns relative to a benchmark 
portfolio, per unit of nonsystematic risk, the risk that in principle can de diversified away by 
holding the market portfolio. 
Information Ratio is defined as 
 
 !"! = !! − !!! !! − !! = αω (10) 
where !"! = Information Ration on the portfolio !! − !! = Active returns, difference between return on the portfolio and benchmark 
returns ! !! − !!  = Tracking error, standard deviation of the active returns. 
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IR is used as a measure to test the skill of fund managers. By measuring the active returns 
divided by the amount of risk taken by the fund manager, relative to the selected benchmark. 
The higher the IR, the better the fund manager has performed. A statistical significant IR 
equal 0.5 can be regarded as good, while 0.75 is very good and IR equal to 1 is exceptional 
good (Goodwin, 1998) 
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3.0 THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO ASSET PRICING 
Section 3.1 introduces behavioral finance as a theoretical alternative to the efficient market 
hypothesis and to give an explanation for the existence of such theory. To give an overview of 
the building blocks of behavioral finance, limits to arbitrage and psychology is introduced in 
section 3.2 and section 3.3. To further explain some of the implication in the market cross-
sectional returns is explained in section 3.4, while the implication for portfolio management is 
explained in section 3.5 
 
3.1 BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
“Modern financial economics assumes that we behave with extreme rationality; but, we do 
not. Furthermore, our deviations from rationality are often systematic. Behavioral finance 
relaxes the traditional assumptions of financial economics by incorporating these observable, 
systematic, and very human departures from rationality into standard models of financial 
markets” (Barber & Odean, 1998, p. 25). 
Under the rational approach to asset pricing, all agents are expected to always behave rational, 
and to make decisions under perfect assumptions. However, both psychological and empirical 
researches show that agents are not fully rational (Barber & Odean, 1998; Dittrich et al., 
2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Behavioral finance tries to give a understanding of what 
happens when agents act irrationally, and thereby, develop new models to better explain 
movements in the financial market (Barberis & Thaler, 2002). Furthermore, behavioral 
finance uses models that accept irrational agents, and tries to cope with it, rather than 
neglecting it. In contrast to the efficient market hypothesis, behavioral finance has not been 
able to produce a unified mathematical framework that explains the variation in stock prices. 
However, the field is still developing and more and more scholars are accepting the presence 
of irrational investors in the market.  
Behavioral finance has mainly two building blocks; limit to arbitrage and cognitive 
psychology (Ritter, 2003; Shleifer & Summers, 1990). 
1) Limit to arbitrage refers to the amount of irrational traders in the market, making 
arbitrage possibilities to conserve. 
2) Cognitive psychology refers to how people behave, and there is a huge amount of 
psychology literature documenting that people do not always make rational choices. 
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3.2 LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE 
Arbitrage can be defined as “The exploitation of security mispricing in such a way that risk-
free profits can be earned (...)” (Bodie, et al., 2008). 
Under the rational approach to asset pricing, security prices are assumed to always be equal to 
the “fundamental value” and prices are seen as “right”. This indicates that rational agents 
would quickly adapt new information in the market, and act according to Bayes’ law. Rational 
agents would then exploit any arbitrage possibility in the market, and thus constantly adjust 
the price according to the “fundamental value”. In contrast, behavioral finance suggests that 
even though arbitrage possibilities exist, not all such opportunities would be utilized, because 
of different risk factors  
Barberis and Thaler argue in their 2002 article “A survey of behavior finance” that in the 
efficient market “prices are right” means “no free lunch”, and similar “no free lunch” means 
“prices are right”. In the inefficient “behavior finance market”,  “prices are right” also means 
“no free lunch”, but “no free lunch” does not implies “prices are right”. This indicates that 
even though there is a mispricing in the market, there is necessarily not any excess risk-
adjusted average return for the taking. This is one of the key differences between the rational 
and the behavioral approach to asset pricing.  
Shleifer and Summer (1990) refers to two types of risk related to limit to arbitrage; 
fundamental risk and movement in investor sentiment, referred to as noise-trader risk. Traders 
who act on non-fundamental info can be defined as noise traders, since they consider noise in 
the market as information. Shleifer and Summer argues that since arbitrage should be risk-
free, irrational investor-behavior limits the arbitrage opportunities.   
Shleifer and Visny (1997) further studied this argument They conclude that specialized 
arbitragers may avoid arbitrage-opportunities due to extreme high volatility, and the 
possibility of a loss leading to liquidation of the portfolio. They suggests that even being an 
opportunity to profit, not all arbitrage positions in the market will be traded. Barber and 
Thaler (2003) also adds implementation cost as a limiting factor, while Montier (2002) adds 
the risk of financing. (Schouw-Hansen, 2007) 
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3.2.1 FUNDAMENTAL RISK 
Fundamental risk refers to the risk of an arbitrager being wrong about the positions taken 
(Montier, 2002). Since arbitrage is going long in one security and short in another, to earn a 
risk-free profit, fundamental risk also refers to the relative mispricing between securities.  
The fundamental risk can be illustrated by going long stock A and short stock B. If stock A 
releases good news, justifying the higher price of stock A, the arbitrage-position must be 
closed with a loss. The mispricing was present due to release of good news and not as a risk-
free mispricing in the market.  
While the arbitrage-strategy may reduce some industry wide risk in the position, not all the 
fundamental risk can be eliminated. Barberis and Thaler (2002) exemplify this by going long 
car manufacturer Ford and short GM, at the time when GM bought Ford. The arbitrager is 
then exposed to risk related to Ford, but, to a certain degree, protected from negative news 
regarding the car industry as a whole. 
 
3.2.2 NOISE TRADER RISK 
According to Black (1986), Kyle (1985) and Long et al. (1990) noise traders are irrational 
investors who base their investment decisions on their own research. Since these investors do 
not have any the inside information, they irrationally act on noise in the market. The notion is 
that noise traders believe that noise in the market can be regarded as information. While fund 
managers and other professionals often hold the same view on stocks or the aggregate market, 
noise traders may have a different perception and thereby making prices move away from the 
expected level. For an arbitrageur the presence of noise traders involves both an opportunity 
to profit, but also a constant risk. Montier (2002) divides the noise trader risk in three; horizon 
risk, margin risk and short covering risk. 
 
HORIZON RISK 
Shleifer and Visny (1997) found that in short time horizons, arbitragers is exposes to horizon 
risk due to the time element of the investment. Since noise traders do not care about the 
“fundamental” value, arbitragers can experience larger deviations from the “fundamental” 
value in short run. The length of time needed for the price to revert back to the “correct” value 
may reduce the arbitragers’ return dramatically. The horizon risk can be exemplified this way; 
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if a 5% underpricing is corrected in one month, the annual rate of return is almost 80%, but if 
the correction takes two years the annual rate of return is below 2.5%. 
 
MARGIN RISK 
Arbitragers often use debt to buy into positions, and if the arbitrage-position moves against 
the arbitrager, it is likely to be faced with a margin call. The arbitrager may then be forced to 
liquidate the position, causing potential losses. Another problem for the professional 
arbitragers is that they often hold position for others, and due to margin risk, trades with high 
volatility may be left untouched (Montier, 2002). 
Liu and Longstaff (2000) claims that being exposed to margin risk, the optimal strategy where 
maximal profit is reached, is less likely to occur. Barberis and Thaler (2002) also stress the 
facts that if a creditor sees the value of the collateral erode, they will likely call back the 
loans, forcing liquidation of the position. 
 
SHORT COVERING RISK 
As the arbitrageur needs to hold a short position in one security he is exposed to short 
covering risk. If the securities which are held short is called back by the owner, this may force 
a premature liquidation of the position (Montier, 2002). 
 
3.2.3 PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS 
Another problem, which cause arbitrage to persist in the market, is the separation of brain and 
capital. Highly specialized arbitragers manage most arbitrage-funds in the market, and since 
they invest other peoples capital, there is “a separation of brains and capital” (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Following this argument, Montier (2002) points out three different principal-
agents problems: 
1) Since the market for arbitrage is highly specialized, it is hard for the investors to 
understand the market, and thereby separate good arbitrager from bad arbitrager. Since 
investors are risk-averse and only provide a certain amount of capital, the arbitrager is 
capital-constrained. 
2) Since investors base their investment decisions on previous performance, funds with a 
good historical performance will easily attract new capital, while funds struggling in the 
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past will have problems gathering new capital. This will again leave some arbitragers 
capital-constrained, indicating that persistence performance is valuable. 
3) The arbitrageurs’ knowledge is constrained due to the high specialization in the market. 
This means that an arbitrageur in the forex market stays in the forex market, and similar 
with the bond market, keeping the markets segmented. 
Montier further argues that these three principle-agent problems are most important under 
extreme conditions. When the mispricing is large, the arbitrager is aware of the possible 
profit, but due to capital-constrains, he is unable to take advantage of the opportunity. The 
best example of the principle agent problems is the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management, which had to liquidate positions due to margin calls and capital constrains.  
 
3.2.4 IMPLEMENTATION COST 
The last risk factor under limits to arbitrage is the implementations costs. Cost is always 
influencing investments decision and arbitrage-possibilities may be left untouched due to high 
implementation costs. Borrowing stocks is especially costly and can reduce the profit heavily. 
The fees for borrowing stocks is normally 10 to 15 basis point, but due to noise traders, it may 
in some situations be almost impossible to borrow stocks at any price, since the demand curve 
for borrowing stocks is upward sloping. This increases the implementations costs and may let 
arbitrage possibilities remain in the market (D'Avolio, 2002). 
 
3.2.5 EVIDENCE OF LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE 
Under the law of one price and the efficient market hypothesis, two similar stocks with 
identical cash flows should have the same price. If that is not the case, the law of one price 
does not hold, and the efficient market hypothesis is violated. The twin-stock phenomena and 
some famous equity cave-outs seem to violate this basic principle. 
TWIN STOCKS 
In 1907 Royal Dutch and Shell Transport decides to merge interests with a 60/40 basis, but 
still remains as separate companies. Royal Dutch traded mainly in USA and in the 
Netherlands, while Shell mainly traded in UK. With a 60/40 merge, Royal Dutch should 
always be worth 1.5 times Shell. Froot and Babora (1999) analyzed the case of Shell and 
Royal Dutch and found a deviation from the theoretical parity of -30% to +20%. They were 
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not able to explain this large deviation from the parity by fundamental factors, meaning 
something else was influencing the price deviation. However, they did find the relative price 
being correlated to the relative price of the indexes where the twins stocks were listed. 
Barberis and Thaler (2002) later found this case revealing limits to arbitrage due to high noise 
trader risk. In 2001 the stocks finally converged and sold at par.  
Another example is Unilever PLC. and Unilever N.V. In 1930 the companies formed an 
agreement to equalize cash flows, and to act as a single group company. After the deal was 
completed, the two stocks used 15 years to converge, and finally to trade at par. Froot and 
Babora (1999) found this long period of mispricing was present due to country-specific 
sentiments. Their study also revealed that even if the investors were rational, the markets were 
too fragmented, causing a two-price system due to transaction costs and agency problems. 
 
EQUITY CARVE OUTS 
When a company decides to sell out a specific part of company itself, is it often done by an 
equity carve-out. Between 1998 and 2000 several equity carve-outs showed mispricing in the 
market, and because of the shorting cost, these mispricings were not exploited (Lamont & 
Thaler, 2001). One example of mispricing in the market after an equity carve-out is the case 
of 3Com and Palm. In 2002, 3Com decided to carve out Palm by issuing an IPO, and at the 
same time give each 3Com owner 1.5 stocks in Palm. The relative price should then give a 
value of 3Com similar to 1.5 times the value of Palm. However, the market used 5 months to 
close this gap. This was a massive arbitrage opportunity, but since private investor owned 
most of the stocks, the implementation cost related to shorting stocks was huge and limited 
the arbitrage possibilities  
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3.3 PSYCHOLOGY 
Since agents are not always mean-variance optimizers, they make mistakes when investing.  
Often are rules-of-thumb used as guidance when dealing with huge sets of information 
(Montier, 2002). In this section, the most relevant findings from studies of common 
psychological traits are presented. To understand how psychology affects investors 
rationality, surveys are often conducted to find, and explain, anomalies in the financial 
market.  
 
3.3.1 OVER-CONFIDENCE 
One common mistake done by investors is to “systematically overestimate the accuracy of 
one’s decisions and the precision of one’s knowledge” (Dittrich, et al., 2001). Overconfidence 
is often referred to as miscalibration, and can be tested by using a calibration test. Studies of 
calibration tests, reveals that overconfidence is largest when the answer is hard to predict, or if 
the result does not give any clear feedback (Koriat et al., 1980). The result of Koriat et al. 
(1980) confirms that stock picking is a subject where people generally tend be overconfident. 
Odean (1998) examined 10.000 discount accounts and found, partly because of 
overconfidence, that the returns were on averrage lowered by high trading activity. Further 
research also finds that men is more overconfident than women and thereby trade more, 
reducing theire performane (Barber & Odean, 1998).  
 
3.3.2 OVER-OPTIMISM 
“Perhaps the best documented of all psychological errors is the tendency to be over-
optimistic. People tend to exaggerate their own abilities. Like the children of Lake 
Woebegone, they are all above average. For instance, when asked if they thought they were 
good drivers, around 80% of people say yes! Ask a room full of students who thinks they will 
finish in the top 50% of the class, on average around 80% of them will respond in the 
affirmative — of course at least 30% of them will be disappointed at the end of the course” 
(Montier, 2002) 
Studies show that both private investors and fund managers are over-optimistic about the 
future earnings, even if the company is expecting losses. The anomaly of over-optimism also 
includes the planning fallacy; people are over-
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tasks, like completing a thesis. This may be due to the illusion of control and self-attribution 
bias (Montier, 2002).  
Also a second survey finds that investors seem to be over-optimistic about future earning, 
even if the company itself is expecting losses. When the company posted their negative 
earnings, the investor was disappointed and the stock fell significantly more than stocks 
without optimistic expectations (Ciccone, 2003). 
 
3.3.3. ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT 
Anchoring is the heuristic that explain that people will base their answer or decision on an 
initial “anchor”, and then adjusts according to believes, to yield their final answer. By using a 
survey, Kahneman and Thaler (1979) found that spinning a wheel of fortune in front of the 
participants, adjusted their answer to any arbitrary question. The study revealed the answers 
being highly correlated with the value on the wheel of fortune. Kahneman et al. (1982) further 
studied this heuristic. They asked two groups of high school students to estimate the product 
of an equation within five seconds: One group was asked to estimate 1*2*3*4*5*6*7*8, 
while the other group was asked 8*7*6*5*4*3*2*1. They found the median estimate answer 
for the ascending sequence to be 512, while the estimate for the descending sequence was 
2.250. The correct answer is 40.320. The way this question was asked, clearly affected the 
answer, due to anchoring (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Montier (2002) asked fund managers about the end value of Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) if one included the dividends. While most fund manager based their answer on the 
DJIA level at that time, 9181, and then doubled or tripled this value, the correct value would 
have been 652.230 (Fisher & Statman, 2000). 
The earnings announcement drift and forward discount puzzle are effects of the anchoring 
heuristic. Since analyst often base their valuations on industry multiples, they use anchoring 
on a daily basis. Valuations are also calculated by using the current stock price as an anchor 
and then adjust according to expectation. 
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3.3.4 REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Since agents are only capable of handling a certain amount of information at the same time, 
the brain sometimes takes shortcut when making decisions. One of these shortcuts is 
representativeness and could be refers to as decisions based on stereotypes (Nofsinger, 2011).  
One example of representativeness is the coin-toss; Shefrin (2001) found that people believe 
that H(ead)T(ail)HTHTHT is more likely than HHHHHHHH, since the first series exhibits 
perfect distribution. This result is in line with sample size bias, where people believe that even 
small samples should represent a fair distribution. 
In the stock market, investors seem to overestimates the earning of good companies, driving 
up the stock price purely on information from the past, and at the same time confusing good 
stocks and good companies. More professional fund managers can utilize this anomaly by 
trading on a momentum strategy and by identifying companies with low price relative to their 
fundamentals. Since representativeness is present in the market, investor and analyst may also 
see the extremity of forecast being adjusted (Ganzach, 1998). 
 
3.3.5 CONSERVATISM 
Montier (2002) argues that conservatism is the tendency to stick with a position, causing 
movement to be very slowly. It can be explained as a psychological explanation for the 
disposition effect. Conservatism leads to under-reactions regarding events, such as profit-
warnings, and in contrast to representativeness, the investors are not able to adjust according 
to the new information.  
Edwards (1968) and further Barberis and Thaler (2002) showed that if the data is not showing 
any clear representativeness or correspondence with a model, then people tend to under-react 
to the information and rely much on prior knowledge. Professional fund managers can utilize 
this anomaly by reacting faster to new information making and by finding unpopular stocks 
that have seen a decline in the price by being unattractive. 
 
3.3.6 MENTAL ACCOUNTING 
Thaler (1999) defines mental accounting as operations of “organize, evaluate and keep track 
of financial decisions”. The fact that people have different accounts in their head when 
evaluating decisions is called narrow framing, or mental accounting. People divide their 
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current and future funds into different non-transferable portions or “silo” and then assigned 
different utility-levels to each account.  
The important part of mental accounting is the opening and closing of different “silos” or 
accounts. Opening an account is when money is sorted into a silo, like investments or savings. 
These types of accounts are rarely closed. Closing happens when something paid in advance 
is consumed, like a vacation or a movie ticket. Most people do not set up different bank 
account for grocery shopping, entertainment or a new TV, but due to mental accounting the 
funds are kept separated. Under this regime, mental accounting can encourage people to be 
more economical and save more, since funds are kept apart in silos and set budget constraints 
(Ackert & Deaves, 2010). 
 
3.3.7 PROSPECT THEORY 
On basic assumption under behavioral finance is the violation of rational agents. In 1979 
psychologists Kahneman and Tversky presented their prospect theory in an attempt to develop 
a new value function that explains decision-making under risk. The article gathered massive 
attention, and is still one of the most cited papers ever written in Econometrica. Since the 
article was presented in 1979, behavioral finance has taken huge steps in the right direction, 
trying to succeed the efficient market hypothesis as the best model for estimating security 
prices. Both Kahneman and Tversky have contributed massively to develop even better 
models, trying to explain how psychics affect business decisions. However, behavioral 
finance has not been able to develop a unified mathematical framework to explain all 
variation in security prices. 
Prospect theory has ever since it was presented, been used as a foundation in the critique 
against the efficient market hypothesis. The theory reveals several results regarding 
inconsistency when faced with decisions under risk. The efficient market hypothesis suggests 
that investors are basing their decisions on expected utility. However, many studies show that 
people systematically violate the expected utility theory (Barber & Odean, 1998; Summers & 
Duxbury, 2007). Barberis and Thaler (2002) argue that violations of the expected utility 
theory can explain some financial phenomena present in the market, but all of them. 
To quantify the prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used several experiments to 
understand the choices being made by agents, faced with decisions under risk.  
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One experiment was to ask agents to choose between different gambles with different 
outcomes, but with the same final wealth.  
One of these gambles were asked the following way: 
“In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1000 dollars. Now choose between A 
and B.” 
A: 1000 dollars with a probability of 0.5 
B: 500 dollars for sure. 
In this case, B was the most popular choice. 
Then the same subjects were asked: 
“In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1000 dollars. Now choose between C 
and D” 
C: -1000 dollars with probability 0.5 
D: -500 dollars for sure. 
Now the answer C was most popular. 
Since the final wealth is the same in both gambles, there is a violation of the expected utility 
theory. According to expected utility theory, agents who choose B should also answer D. 
However, this reveals the core of the prospect theory; the non-linear value function. 
By examining different variation of such gambles, Kahneman and Tversky were able to 
conclude that agents define their total utility over gains and losses, rather than final wealth, 
and that probabilities are replaced by decision weights. Since decision weights are found to be 
lower than the corresponding probabilities, the agents are likely to be influenced by other 
factors than utility. Uncertainty and focus on the change of utility rather than total level of 
utility, are two factors that may influence the decisions.  
For an investor faced with an investment opportunity, a gain of $1000 increases utility less 
than a loss of $1000 reduces it. This gives a non-linear relationship between stated probability 
and decision weights. Kahneman and Thaler illustrates this non-linear relationship with a 
game of Russian roulette:  
“Would you pay as much to reduce the number of bullets from four to three as you would to 
reduce the number of bullets from one to zero?”  
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Most people answered that they would be willing to pay much more for a reduction of the 
probability of death from 1/6 to zero than for a reduction from 4/6 to 3/6.” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979)  
Secondly, they found that people are risk averse for gains of moderate to high probability and 
losses of low probability, and risk seeking for gains of low probability and losses of moderate 
to high probability. This gives a value function that is defined on deviation from a reference 
point, and is normally concave for gains and convex for losses. The function is also steeper 
for losses than for gains.  
The last part of the theory is the nonlinear probability transformation, which shows that small 
probabilities are overweighed. This means that people place more weight on a jump of 20% 
from 0.8 to 1 than a jump from 0.2 to 0.25. This has later been known as the “certainty effect” 
(Barberis & Thaler, 2002).  
However, prospect theory is not perfect since it easy to find gambles with payments X and Y, 
where Y > X in all situations. This violates the prospect theory, and is why Kahneman and 
Thaler released a revision of the prospect theory in 1992 adjusting the theory to a cumulative 
level. 
 
3.3.8 DISPOSITION EFFECT 
As presented in section 3.3.7, prospect theory explained that most people have an “S-shaped” 
value-function that is defined over gains and losses, rather than total value. Since the value-
function is linked to a reference point, people generally tend to be risk-averse. In this regard 
researchers claim that investors tend to sell over-performing stocks, and to hold on to under-
performing stocks (Ferris et al., 1988; H. Shefrin & Statman, 1985). This effect is called 
disposition effect, and can easily be observed in the market. The most common comment by 
private investors is perhaps, “the stock has gone up, I better sell to realize the gain” or “the 
stock has gone down, but the money is not lost until I sell the stock”. This comment clearly 
shows the disposition effect.  
Shefrin and Statman (1985) explain the disposition effect by prospect theory and regret 
aversion. Considering the value function of prospect theory, it is easy to see why people tend 
to sell winners. After a large gain of value, you are risk-averse and thereby thinking on how to 
sustain the value. On the other side, after a loss, you have moved to the risk-seeking part of 
the value-function, and thereby stick with the position. They also found that investors feel 
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regret when closing a position due to a bad investment decision, and pride when the closing of 
a position resulting in a profit.  
Odean (1998) observed 10.000 trading records and clearly found that people keep losers and 
sell winners. Odean tried to explain these observations with timing effects and rebalancing, 
but found nothing to support these hypotheses. 
More recent studies (Barberis & Xiong, 2009; Summers & Duxbury, 2007; Weber & 
Camerer, 1998) also show that emotions have a great influence on the investment decision. 
By using a two-period version of the prospect theory, it is clear that the first decision to buy 
the stock would influence how the investors feels about the investment; If the investors have 
picked the stocks themselves, the regret and rejoice will be stronger than if the stock are 
picked by other. This means that if the investor is responsible for the outcome, both if it is a 
loss or a gain, the investor will show a disposition effect.  
 
3.3.9 AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC 
Studies show that current available information is used as a base when investors make their 
investment decisions. This leads to a situation where an event that is easy to remember is 
given a higher probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
Having a clever stock ticker is found to giving returns higher than the market (Head et al., 
2009). This indicates that investors use information that is easy to remember, and is available 
when taking their decisions. Publicity from media will also affect the trading activity, and 
companies with easy names are found to perform better than market, especially right after 
public listing (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006). 
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3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR STOCK PRICES 
Through empirical studies of individual stocks, researchers have found that some groups of 
stocks can earn higher than average returns. These abnormal returns are often linked to under- 
and overreactions made by investors. Scholars from the rational approach and the behavioral 
approach have different explanations for these cross-sectional returns; Fama (1997) argues 
that the different anomalies are rational, and adds support to the theory about efficient market. 
He suggests the anomalies being chance results, and that overreaction and under-reaction is 
equally common. He further finds that most of the long-term anomalies are fragile and tend to 
disappear with changes in the way they are measured (Fama, 1997).  
In contrast, Daniel et al. (2004) argues that these cross-sectional returns are a result of 
investor behavior. They suggest that overconfidence among investors implies an overreaction 
to private information and under-reaction to public information. They also suggest that 
investors have different confidence based on the outcome of their decision.  
In this section some of the most known anomalies, or cross-sectional stock returns, are 
described.  
 
3.4.1 THE SIZE AND VALUE PREMIUM 
By sorting stocks into deciles based in their size Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992) 
found that smaller firms have higher risk adjusted returns than the market. Fama and French 
(1992) studied the period from 1963-1990, and used data on all stocks listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ. Each stock was sorted into deciles based on their market value, and 
return in each declie was calculated. Their study found that the smallest stocks quintile yield a 
0.74% higher return than the large-stock quintile each month.  
More recent studies in the German-, Taiwan- and the UK market, confirms the existence of 
the size-anomaly in the market. (Amel-Zadeh, 2010; Y.-S. Huang, 1997; Levis, 1989). 
However, due to the increase of institutional investor in the market in the later years, the size-
premium seems to have been reduced  (Banz, 1981; Fama & French, 1992; Gompers & 
Metrick, 2001). 
Fama and French (1992) also found that stocks with high book-to-market ratio, value stocks, 
had higher returns than stock with low book-to-market ratio.  
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Under the rational approach, Fama and French (1992) suggest the value premium could be 
seen as a risk factor. They argue that risk related to stock returns is multidimensional, and that 
one risk factor is the book-to-market ratio. This risk factor may be considered as the relative 
distress factor observed by Chan and Chen (1991), indicating that stocks with high book-to-
market ratio are more vulnerable to financial distress.  
The behavioral approach to asset pricing has a different explanation for the size premium; 
Skinner and Sloan (1999) argue that the size premium is present due to earning shocks. Their 
findings indicate that most of the realized value premium is a result of stock prices adjusting 
after earnings surprises, rather than the expected risk premium. The value premium will be 
futher disused in section 4.2 Chan and Chen, 1991) (Fama & French, 1996) Chan and Chen, 
1991) 
 3.4.2 MOMENTUM 
Momentum is the anomaly where returns are positive correlated with previous returns. This is 
in contrast to reversal where returns are negative correlated with previous returns. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) found that over a holding period of 3-5 years, stocks with poor 
performance in the prior 3-5 year, outperformed the stocks with better prior performance. 
They argue that momentum is due to overreaction in the market, making the extreme losers 
cheap and thereby bounce back, whereas as the extreme winners become too expensive and 
fall back. De Bondt and Thaler also argues for a long-time reversal of the momentum factor, 
indicating that over a long time-period prior winner become losers. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) further studied the momentum factor in the short run. By sorting all stocks from 1963 
to 1989 on NYSE into deciles based on their six-month prior performance, found that the 
prior winners outperformed prior losers by 10% on an annual basis. The stock performing best 
was no more risky than the worst performing. They argue that the momentum anomaly is due 
to under-reaction by investors to the release of firm-specific information, which indicates a 
cognitive bias. The length on the prior ranking period has an important influence on the 
results, and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found different results when they used different 
time periods (Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993).  
Using the Fama-French three factor model, Fama and French (1992) tried to give a rational 
explanation for the momentum anomaly However, their result indicates that the three-factor 
model is not able to explain the short-time momentum strategy, since all of the intercepts are 
positive for short-term winners (La Porta et al., 1995).  
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3.4.3 52-WEEK HIGH ANOMALY 
Another momentum strategy is the 52-week high strategy. By calculating the ratio between a 
stock’s current stock prices and it’s past 52-week high price, stocks are determined to be 
either winner or losers. By constructing a zero-investment portfolio consisting of long-
winners and short-losers, George and Hwang (2004) created a 52-week high strategy yielding 
0.45% return in the US stock market.  
They also found, in contrast Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993), that long-time revarsal do not 
occure. Further, they showed that nearness to the 52-week high is a better predictor of future 
returns than past returns. This indicates that the price-levels are more important than previous 
price changes. (George & Hwang, 2004). A more recent study also finds the 52-week high 
anomaly in nine out of thirteen stock markets, with average monthly returns of 0.6% to 1.0% 
(M. Liu et al., 2011). 
 
3.4.4 POST-EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT 
The post-earnings announcement drift is observed by using event studies, to understand how 
the stock-price reacts to earnings announcement. This method is used to compare companies 
over event-time rather than calendar-time. To study this anomaly, researcher divide the stock 
into deciles based on the earning-announcement, from extremely positive to extremely 
negative. Based on the deviation from the expected announcement, scaled by volatility, they 
found that stocks with the biggest surprise outperformed the market by over 2%. Different 
studies find the anomaly in both in the US and the UK market, and even if the surprise is 
measured relative to analysts’ expectations, the anomaly is present (Bernard & Thomas, 1989; 
L. K. Chan et al., 1995; W. Liu et al., 2000). 
The post-earnings announcement drift anomaly violates the efficient market hypothesis since 
a speculative profit would remain, even after transaction cost. The most accepted explanation 
for the anomaly is the under-estimation of earnings-announcement made by investor. The 
post-earnings-announcement drift is one of the most accepted anomalies in the market, and 
even Eugene Fama accept this anomaly to be present and robust (Fama, 1997). 
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3.4.5 SEASONALITY EFFECT 
Studies of stock-returns consistently show that returns on stocks are higher at some days of 
the week, at some times of the week or even in some specific months of the year. The 
different anomalies are found in stocks, treasure bills, debt and even exchange rates.  
DAY-OF THE-WEEK EFFECT 
Research shows that weekdays have influence on the expected stock return. Several studies 
prove that returns on Mondays are found to be abnormal negative, which is referred to as the 
weekend-effect. While Fama (1980) found abnormal positive returns on Mondays, more 
recent studies have shown abnormal negative returns on Monday and abnormal positive 
returns on Fridays. A rather new study found that the day-of-the-week effect is a rolling term, 
and the statically Monday and Friday effect has disappeared. However, they clearly find a 
weekday-effect, but it wanders between a random walk and a fixed weekday effect (Doyle & 
Chen, 2009). In his study of empirics on the Oslo Stock Exchange, Ødegaard (2010) finds 
Fridays having the best daily average returns (0.14 daily return), while Monday had lowest 
returns (0.02 daily return), clearly in line with international studies. 
MONTH EFFECT 
Wachtel (1942) was first to observe the January-effect, which suggests a higher realized 
return in January, than in the rest of the year. However, this does not imply that taking a long 
position in January and neutral or short in rest of the year would yield any excess return. 
Some market participants argue that this anomaly have disappeared the recent years, while 
some studies still find evidence of higher returns in January (Haug & Hirschey, 2006). There 
is also evidence of that the period from May to October yield less return than October to May. 
The same effect in present the Norwegian market, with January having the highest average a 
monthly return of 3.9%, and September the lowest average a monthly return -0.2% 
(Ødegaard, 2010) 
 
3.4.6 Affect  
Statman et al. (2008) showed that investors prefer stock with positive effect, where effect is 
defined as the quality of “goodness” or “badness”. The investors’ preferences drive up the 
price on the stocks with positive affect, lowering the returns. After controlling for the market, 
size, style and momentum the stocks with negative affect still generate an alpha of 2% per 
annum (Statman et al., 2008). 
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3.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
Under both the rational approach and the behavioral approach, fund managers are trying to 
beat the market. This is done trough active management of the fund.  
By active fund management the fund manager is trying to generate excess returns above the 
return on a benchmark. To beat the market, the fund manager needs to have information or be 
skilled, and for this the manager is compensated. This means that active funds have much 
higher fees than index- and passive managed funds.  
There is mainly two different ways the manager can beat the benchmark; market timing or 
stock-picking. Market timing is done by varying the exposure to different risk factor through 
bull- and bear-market. Stock-picking is done by underweighting or overweighting in 
particular securities relative to the benchmark.  
Since an active fund is trying to outperform the market, it is required that the market is not 
semi-strong efficient, as defined in section 2.1. If the market were efficient, there would be no 
incentive for the fund manager to engage in the costly process of gathering information. This 
equilibrium is referred to as an “equilibrium of degree of disequilibrium” (Grossman & 
Stiglitz, 1980). In the Norwegian market, Sørensen (2009) argues that since Oslo Stock 
Exchang is a small market, professional mutual fund managers are more likely to do well, 
based on the notion that inefficiency is more likely to be present in a small market. Following 
that argument, by investigating mutual fund performance on Oslo Stock Exchange, one could 
also test the level of efficiency in the market.  
In the context of behavioral finance, Shefrin and Statman (2002) developed a way to construct 
optimal portfolios when taking mental accounting into consideration, and compared it to the 
mean-variance optimal portfolio. They suggest that the behavioral portfolio should be created 
using a pyramid structure, including risky assets at the top level, and less risky assets at lower 
level. They further argue that the behavioral portfolio consist of both safe investments, and 
investments which can be categorized as lottery tickets (H. M. Shefrin & Statman, 2002). 
Curtis (2004) builds further on the work of Shefrin and Statman (2002) and combines the 
mean-variance portfolio and the behavioral portfolio, in order to create the best portfolio for 
the investor. He argues that the investor may start out with a behavioral portfolio, and then 
converge toward the mean-variance optimal portfolio in order to obtain the optimal portfolio 
for the investor. (H. M. Shefrin & Statman, 2002).  
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4.0 MUTUAL FUND INVESTING AND PERFORMANCE  
In this section 4.1 a short review of different studied concerning mutual fund inventing is 
presented. Section 4.2 conations a discussion on the difference between behavioral and 
rational portfolio management. Section 4.3 concerns the issue of value investing, whereas 
sections 4.4 introduce the Norwegian fund market. 
4.1 MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE 
Numerous studies have been conducted in order to test the performance of active managed 
funds. Jensen conducted one of the first studies, in 1968. He studied 115 mutual funds and 
their performance in the period from 1945 to 1964. Using the single index model, Jensen 
found that on average active funds earned about 1.1% less per year than they should 
considering their level of systematic risk. He did only find small evidence that any individual 
fund was able to do significantly better than expected from mere random chance. Jensen finds 
similar results both at gross and net level, which indicates that active managed funds were not 
successful enough to cover up the broker expenses (Jensen, 1968). 
As mention in section 2.4, Fama and French (1992) introduce the Fama and French three-
factor model to capture market behaviour. This model is an extended version of the CAPM 
developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), and the model captures the 
risk-variables related to size and market capitalization. The purpose of their study in 1992 was 
to given a better explanation for the cross-section of expected stock returns. In 2008 Fama and 
French applies their model developed in 1992, in order to test mutual fund performance. They 
start out from the perspective of equilibrium, and examine mutual funds at the aggregate 
level. Their findings show that the mutual fund industry, as a whole, holds a portfolio much 
like the market portfolio. Using the three-factor model of Fama and French (1992) the study 
reports negative alpha values on the net level. Over the total time period, the equally weighted 
portfolio delivers an annualized gross return of 0.61%, but at the net level the annualized 
returns are -0.52%. This indicates that on the aggregate level, active managed mutual funds 
has not been able to deliver abnormal return to the investor after controlling for risk related to 
the three factor portfolios, and deducting costs. Their results further suggest that the cross-
section of average fund returns is a result of randomness, rather than skill. The result of Fama 
and French supports the findings of both Jensen (1968) and Carhart (1997) 
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Carhart (1997) also performed a study on mutual fund performance. Using a survivorship-
bias-free dataset, he studied 1892 mutual funds in the time period from 1962 to 1992. His 
study for persistence in fund performance was conducted using the singe-index model and the 
Carhart four-factor model. To examine short-time persistence, all funds are sorted into ten 
equally weighted portfolios using reported returns. The portfolios are held for one year before 
they are reformed. Carhart reports that holding the top decile over the total time period yield a 
monthly excess return of 0.68%. In contrast, holding the bottom decile yield only a monthly 
excess return of 0.01%. Carhart’s results also indicated that the single-index model is no able 
to explain the relative return on these portfolios, since the top decile and the bottom declie has 
almost the same beta coefficient. Using the Carhart model explains more of the spread and 
pattern in these portfolios, and he reports that most of the difference in performance can be 
explained by the sensitivity to small stock and to momentum. However, none of the deciles 
are able to deliver positive alpha under the four-factor model. To test for long time persistence 
the funds are ranked according to their alpha estimated over the prior 3-years. Using this 
method, Carhart reports that the strategy of buying the top declie and selling the bottom declie 
would yield a return on 8% per year. He argues that most of this spread is due to market value 
and the momentum factor. Carhart concludes that only fund in the top decile are able to earn 
back their investments expenses both in the short- and long-run, but most funds are 
underperforming about the size of their investment cost (Carhart, 1997). 
To test whether behavioral finance has practical application for mutual funds, Reinhart and 
Brennan (2007) studied the performance of nine mutual funds that claim to use behavioral 
finance in their investments strategy. Using the CAPM they calculated the Jensen’s alpha, 
information ratio and the Treynor ratio. Their results indicate that, on a risk-adjusted level, 
large-cap behavioral funds preformed considerable better than small-cap, value and growth 
behavioral funds, and also outperformed their respective Morningstar and Lipper indices. The 
information ratio supports these findings, though growth fund outperformed large-cap under 
the information ratio. Their overall conclusion is that behavioral funds investing in large-
capitalized securities take best advantage of behavioral factors. Reinhart and Brennan argues 
this is a result of large-capitalized securities being highly liquid, well known for many 
investors, followed in the media a therefore vulnerable to irrational investors. 
Wright et al (2006) further expand the literature on behavioral fund performance by studying 
the performance of 16 behavioral mutual funds. They define behavioral mutual fund as funds 
that claims to base their investments strategy on principles of behavioral finance. Their study 
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examine whether the funds are profiting from the doctrine. By using different variations of the 
Carhart four-factor model they measure the performance both individual for each funds, and 
for an equally weighted portfolio. Their results indicated that behavioral mutual funds are 
successfully attracting investment dollar. They also find the funds outperforming S&P 500 
index funds, and to some extend outperform non-behavioral funds on a non-risk-adjusted 
level. They further suggest this ability to beat the S&P 500 index funds is a function of 
relative high loading on the HML factor from the Fama and French model in times when the 
realization on this factor was high. However, they conclude that behavioral mutual funds have 
not been able to deliver any abnormal return outside the four factors of the Carhart model. 
They also find the funds not being able to time their loading on the realization on the four 
factors from the Carhart model. This leads to their conclusion that behavioral finance is not 
much more than value investing.  
Compared to the number of studies of the US market, only a few studies concerning the 
Norwegian fund market have been conducted. Gjerde and Sættem (1991) was one the first 
studies on Norwegian mutual fund performance. Their study involved 14 mutual funds in the 
time period from 1982 to 1990. When analyzing the systematic risk related to the funds, their 
results indicates that funds from the same management had almost similar risk profiles, while 
comparing risk profiles between management companies showed significant differences. 
They results further suggests that some of the fund managers had the ability to time the 
market, but managers were not able to outperform the market index benchmark at a risk-
adjusted level. 
Sørensen (2009) conducted the most comprehensive study of mutual fund performance in the 
Norwegian market. He studied mutual fund performance by using a dataset free of 
survivorship-bias over the time period from 1982 to 2008 and applied the Fama and French 
(1992) model to analyze the risk-adjusted performance. The results show little evidence of 
funds being able to produce any risk-adjusted excess returns compared to the benchmark 
returns. The study further indicates that looking at prior performance is not a good predictor 
of future performance, since there is no evidence of persistence performance among the funds. 
Sørensen do find some funds performing well in terms of actual returns, but he suggests this 
is a result of the funds taking on risk systematic risk measured by beta. Sørensen sums up his 
study by concluding that his data adds support to the famous thesis about a blindfolded 
monkey throwing darts at Wall Street Journal to select a portfolio, would do just  as well as a 
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carefully selected portfolio (Reinhart & Brennan, 2007). He further suggests that the best 
investment decision is to buy a broad index fund with low expenses. 
 
4.2 BEHAVIORAL VERSUS RATIONAL PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
Portfolio management can in general be divided between active and passive management. As 
presented in section 2.7, the rational approach suggests that the optimal portfolio consist of a 
combination of the risk-free rate and the market portfolio. In contrast, the behavioral approach 
to portfolio management suggests that the fund should be active managed and utilize some of 
the anomalies created by psychology. The topic of active fund management is still under 
discussion, though most of the later studies report that active managed funds are not able to 
outperform the market on a risk-adjusted level (Sørensen, 2009; Tveito, 2006; Wermers, 
2000). Studies of behavioral mutual funds indicate that funds following a behavioral strategy 
are able to outperform index funds, but not earn risk-adjusted abnormal returns (J. C. Huang 
et al., 2010; Wright, et al., 2006). Regarding the discussion of passive versus active portfolio 
management, the study of Wright et al. (2006) could indicate that active portfolio 
management is earning better returns for the investor. Other studies indicate that active 
managed funds with a consistent strategy are in fact able to outperform funds with a shifting 
strategy. One can also argue that passive management is better when the market holds a high 
degree of efficiency, like the US market (Chen & Zhao, 2009). 
 
4.3 VALUE INVESTING 
One on the main discussions between the supporters of behavioral finance and supporters of 
the efficient market hypothesis is the case of value investing. Value investing can be defined 
as investing in stocks with high book-to-market ratio in order to capitalize on the value 
premium. The value premium has been given a brief introduction in section 3.4.1, however, in 
this section the different explanations for the presence of the value premium is discussed.  
The rational approach to explaining the value premium is to assign a risk factor to value 
stocks in order to explain the relative higher return. After examining stock returns, and 
finding the value premium to be present, Fama and French (1992) attribute the high return of 
value stocks to the distress factor observed by Chan and Chen (1991). This is further studied 
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by Fama and French (1998). Using international data, they observed that a portfolio of value 
stocks outperformed a portfolio of growth stocks by 7.68% per year in the time period 1975- 
1995. They suggest that adding a risk factor related to relative distress in the APT developed 
by Ross (1976) or the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973) 
captures the value premium. Liew and Vassalou (1999) tried to explain the relative high 
return on value stocks by linking the HML portfolio to future economical growth. Their study 
adds support to the view of Fama and French since returns on the HML portfolio is positive 
correlated to further economical growth. They conclude that a risk-based explanation is 
plausible and likely, since HML can be considered a state variable that predict future changes 
in investments opportunity set.  
Zhang (2005) adds further support to the rational explanation for the value premium. His 
explanation relies on two assumptions; Costly reversibility and countercyclical price of risk. 
Under these assumptions, Zhang argues that value stocks are burden with capital that is 
unproductive during bad times. This implies that growth stocks are more capable of adjusting 
their capital base in order to always stay productive, and thus value stocks must be associated 
with risk related to distress. He further argues that reducing the capital in place is harder than 
reducing the new investments, causing value stocks to be more risky than growth stocks.  
The unified explanation for the value premium under the rational approach is risk related to 
distress. All of the studies laid out above conclude that value stocks are more risky, and 
thereby have higher returns relative to growth stocks, causing the value premium to be present 
in the market.  
The behavioral explanation for the value premium is based on misjudgment by investors. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argues in their study that value premium is a result of “noise traders 
extrapolation past information too far into the future”. They suggest that investors buy up 
growth stocks making them pricy, and thus reducing the return to the investor. The buy-up is 
done on prior information about growth, and the hope that growth will continue, are 
increasing the price. Lakonishok et al. further argues that the market overestimates future 
growth rates of glamour stock, relative to value stocks, and in contrast to Fama and French 
(1992) they find value stocks not being more risky than growth stocks in terms of 
fundamental risk. To conclude their study, they suggest that the value premium is present in 
the market since both individual and institutional investors seems to prefer glamour stocks 
and avoid value stocks. The reason for this is the history of growth stock, having a higher 
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growth rate that value stocks. There also seems to be misjudgment that good companies are 
good stocks. The last suggestion presented by Lakonishok et al. is that short time horizon may 
favor growth stocks compared to value stocks, since not all investors have the long time 
horizon on the investment. 
In a more recent study, Skinner and Sloan (1999) examined growth and value stocks around 
earnings announcements. They found that growth stocks delivering results short of the 
expectations fell significantly more that value stocks that missed the expectations. The 
difference was 9%, with growth stocks falling 15% and value stocks falling 6% after missing 
the expectations by 5%. They attribute the large negative reaction in growth stocks to the fact 
that investors buying growth stocks are expecting the growth to continue, and thus the relative 
negative reaction will be larger. This supports the study of Lakonishok et al. (1994) that 
investors overestimate future growth rates based on history.   
James Montier is a behavioral analyst. He sums up his two books on value and behavioral 
investing, that value investing is caused by behavioral biases (Montier, 2007, 2009). He 
argues that value investing is the only method that has been able to deliver sustainable returns 
over a long time period. By citing multiple studies, Montier explains why the efficient market 
hypothesis is not relevant, and why the modern portfolio theory is outdated. Montier also adds 
support to the value strategy of Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffet. In the article “The 
Superinvestors of Graham-and Dodd” Buffet refuse the efficient market hypothesis, and states 
that some fund managers are actually able to outperform the market by following the value 
strategy. This adds support to the argument about the difference between price and value 
being a result of irrational investors in the market, and not related to risk (Buffett, 1984). 
Even though there is a common knowledge that the value premium exists in the market, 
researchers still argue why the anomaly is present (Fama & French, 1996; Gompers & 
Metrick, 2001; La Porta, et al., 1995). As discussed in this section, the rational and the 
behavioral approach offer different explanations: the rational approach considers value stocks 
more risky, whereas the behavioral explanation is that value stocks have higher returns as a 
result of irrational investors. This also causes problems when evaluating value funds. Some 
value funds may consider the value premium being a result of distress risk, while other may 
consider the value strategy being a behavioral strategy.  However, since the question still 
remains unsolved, the value premium must the interpreted by the each investor according to 
his conviction. 
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4.4 THE NORWEGIAN FUND MARKET 
The majority of funds in the Norway market are active-traded and open-end funds. From the 
first funds was established around 1982 and until today, the Norwegian fund industry has seen 
a large development both in capital under management and the number of funds.  
The first tests of performance in the Norwegian fund market report that the market value was 
only around 290 million NOK in 1982 (Gjerde & Sættem, 1991). After the significant growth 
in matter of numbers of Norwegian mutual funds during the 1980 and 1980, there has been a 
reversal in the years after 2000. However, the fund-market as a whole has been steadily 
increasing also after year 2000. Is also seems to be a shift from funds with a Norwegian 
mandate, to  funds with a more international mandate. While 92% of capital in 1994 was 
invested in funds with a Norwegian mandate, this share has decreased steadily and was less 
than 20% by the end of 2008. Asset under management was reported to be around 50 billion 
NOK in 2007, a number which was almost halved during the financial crises of 2008, due to 
large negative return (Sørensen, 2009).  
FIGURE 1: NET INFLOW IN NORWEGIAN MUTUAL FUNDS 1995-2009 
 
The figure displays the net inflow into Norwegian mutual funds . Year is denoted on the horizontal-axis and 
billion NOK on vertical-axis. (Source: Norwegian Fund and asset management association, www.vff.no) 
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5.0 SELECTION OF FUNDS AND DATA SAMPLE 
This section presents the data sample gathered and selection of funds that lays the foundation 
for the empirical result in section 6. Section 5.1 presents the selection of funds and the 
comparison tools applied when analyzing the empirical results. Section 5.2 gives a brief 
review of the data sample and presents the regression models applied. 
 
5.1 SELECTION OF FUNDS 
In order to recognize behavioral mutual funds in the Norwegian market, the funds are 
categorized based on the written statement in which the fund manager induces to utilize 
“behavioral finance” to make investment decisions, a methodology also adapted by Reinhart 
and Brennan (2007), and Wright et al. (2006). Unlike the fund managers in the US market, 
none of the fund managers in the Norwegian market explicitly admits make investments based 
on behavioral finance. As discussed in section 2, 3 and 4, this means defining what makes a 
mutual fund behavioral involves subjectivity; some funds are clearly not trying to utilize 
known anomalies and rely only on different quantitative analysis, while others use behavioral 
finance to some extent. Though funds have different strategies, behavioral finance is generally 
trying to profit from errors made by the investor at the aggregate level.  
A detailed and comprehensive review of 67 prospectuses of Norwegian funds, published on 
the Morningstar and the fund manager’s website, is done in order to familiarize behavioral 
mutual funds in the Norwegian market. Based on the prospectus of funds and about the 
investment philosophy of the different fund companies, I try to match their strategy with 
anomalies caused by either limits to arbitrage or psychology. As earlier noted, all active fund 
managers are trying to outperform the market, indicating that all funds violate the efficient 
market hypothesis. This could be an argument for inclusion of all active managed funds in the 
dataset, thus categorizing all active funds as behavioral. However, by reading prospectuses I 
find some funds clearly using already known cross-sectional average returns in their strategy, 
while other may try to utilize the anomalies created by behavioral anomalies. Inclusion of all 
funds will thus be a mix of conventional funds betting on luck and timing, whereas the 
behavioral funds follows a strategy involving anomalies created by behavioral finance.  
As discussed in section 3, there exist some well-known anomalies in the stock market that 
may be utilized by mutual funds. These anomalies, among others, include representativeness 
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(Ganzach, 1998), conservatism (Montier, 2002) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). These characteristics lay the foundation 
of the selection of funds in the empirical analysis in this thesis.  
Based on the mutual fund investment philosophy, I have identified six funds in the Norwegian 
market that shows characteristics that might indicate applying a behavioral finance strategy. 
The strength of the characteristics varies between the selected funds. A more detailed review 
for inclusion of each specific fund is further discussed in section 5.2.1.  
5.1.1 SURVIVORSHIP BIAS 
The database consisting of 67 Norwegian mutual funds might contain survivorship bias, since 
only funds alive at the end of 2010 are included. Survivorship biases may have an impact on 
the empirical results, since bad performing funds are liquidated and removed. In this study, 
one cannot be sure that funds, which use behavioral finance, have not been liquidated. 
Sørensen (2009) reports survivorship biases in the Norwegian market, in the time frame 1982-
2009, making an annual difference between all funds and surviving fund of 0.84%.  
5.1.2 SELECTION BIAS 
An issue for this study is selection bias. Since the funds are selected after a subjective analysis 
of the prospectus and investment profile, is it highly likely that some behavioral funds are 
neglected and not included in the sample. It is also likely that some of the funds included are 
not using behavioral finance as a part of their strategy. Another implication is the inclusion of 
some value funds, which makes the sample biased towards value investing. As discussed in 
section 4.3 the strategy of value investing could be considered both rational and behavioral. It 
is therefore important to remember the selection bias when analyzing the empirical results.  
(Fjæreide, 2005; Pedersen & Vorland, 2003). 
5.2 PRESENTATION OF SELECTED FUNDS 
Using a dataset consisting of 67 Norwegian or Norwegian/International mutual funds, I have 
identified 6 funds that may use behavioral finance in their investment strategy. The dataset 
was provided by Oslo Stock Exchange and contains monthly net return calculated using 
arithmetic average after deducting fixed management costs from the net asset value.  
In order to recognize behavioral mutual funds in the Norwegian market, the funds are 
categorized based on the written statement in which the fund manager induces to utilize 
“behavioral finance” to make investment decisions, as mentioned above. The Norwegian 
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mutual fund managers’ do not explicitly admits that they make investing decisions in contrast 
to mutual fund managers in the US market. Wright et al. (2006) identified 16 self-proclaimed 
or media-identified behavioral mutual funds, as they define, in the US market. As mutual fund 
managers in the Norwegian market do not explicitly have “behavioral” as a part of their fund 
names or directly quote the mutual funds as "behavioral”, the data sample approach of 
Reinhart and Brennan (2007) and Wright et.al (2006) cannot directly be adapted in this study. 
Therefore, a similar approach to define the data sample is implemented. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the selected funds: Pareto Aksje Norge, Dephi Norge, PLUSS Aksje, Odin 
Norge, Skagen Vekst and Holberg Norge. The table also lists the fund management company. 
None of these managers explicitly admits that their funds are “behavioral” but their 
investment profile show similarities to behavioral funds. This is the foundation of the 
selection of funds and will be reviewed in detail in the fund sections below.  
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON SELECTED FUNDS 
Fund Ticker Manager Inception 
date 
Benchmark Asset under 
management 
Pareto 
Aksje 
Norge 
PAA Pareto Asset 
Management As 
06.09.2001 OSEFX NOK 6 905 
mill. 
Delphi 
Norge 
DHN Delphi 
Fondsforvaltning 
As 
03.06.1994 
  
OSEFX NOK 858 mill. 
Pluss 
Aksje 
PLA Fondsforvaltning 
As 
01.12.1996 OSEFX NOK 136 mill. 
Odin 
Norge 
ODN Odin Forvaltning 
As 
26.06.1992 OSEFX NOK 6 127 
mill. 
Skagen 
Vekst 
SKV Skagen Forvaltning 
As 
01.12.1993 OSEBX and  
MSCI AC 
(50/50) 
NOK 10 230 
mill. 
Holberg 
Norge 
HBN Holberg 
Fondsforvaltning 
As 
28.12.2000 OSEFX NOK 2 612 mill 
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PARETO AKSJE NORGE 
Following the investment strategy tought by Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett, Pareto 
Forvaltning invests in solid companies with strong balance sheets, high equity ratio and high 
return on equity. The strategy imposes a long time horizon and their investment decisions are 
not influenced by short term “waves” in the market. Pareto Forvaltning has around 15 billion 
NOK in capital under management. 
Started in 2001, Pareto Aksje Norge “invests in companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
Norway. With a value, long-only investment philosophy, we look for well managed companies 
with an understandable business model and transparency to risk-taking” (Forvaltning, 2010) 
The fund holds 6.9 billion NOK in asset under management and is benchmarked against 
OSEFX. 
WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
By picking value-stocks, the fund may try to capitalize on the relative high cross-sectional 
returns of stocks with high book-to-market value. This is can also be a way to capitalize on 
the anomalies of conservatism and representativeness, since small private investors react 
slowly to new information, and the fact that noise traders confuse good companies with good 
stocks. Pareto also states that they follow the value strategy laid out by Warren Buffet, which 
is said to be critical about the efficient market hypothesis. Buffett argues that the market 
contains inefficiency since herd behavior, greedy people or emotional persons can drive prices 
away from their fundamental value. While not riding the short term “waves”, the fund can to 
some extend be regarded as behavioral, since they are comparing the fundamental value to the 
price. If irrational noise traders were not present in the market, the fundamental value and the 
stock price should be equal, not making such value investing profitable. The fact that Pareto 
follows Warren Buffett’s strategy implies they are aware of noise traders in the market and 
are trying to capitalize on irrational market prices, perhaps created by different behavioral 
biases. Pareto can thus be categorized to have a behavioral approach to the value premium. 
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Delphi Norge 
Delphi has an investment philosophy based on both fundamental analysis and trend analysis. 
While most of the active managed funds only use fundamental analysis, the edge for Delphi is 
also the use of trend analysis. This way of utilizing momentum in the market makes them able 
to capture trends, and to increase their ability to time and select the correct investments 
(Fondene, 2011a). 
Established in 1994, Delphi Norge invests in Norwegian stocks. By selecting 3-5 stocks 
divided between minimum 5 sectors, the focus is to identify stock showing strong momentum 
yielding potential high short-term returns. The fund has NOK 858 mill in capital under 
management and is benchmarked against OSEFX. 
WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
The prospectus of Delphi Norge indicates that the fund is trying to capitalize on the 
momentum factor using trend analysis. Using the momentum factor to capture drift in stock 
prices may be considered as trying to utilize the effect of herd behavior in the stock market. 
As laid out in section 3.4.2, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argues that in the short run, prior 
winner continue to outperform prior losers. Their study found that momentum factor being 
present in the market due psychological elements. Knowing that momentum is a profitable 
strategy, Delphi Norge may try to capture the short time trend caused by irrational investors, 
which is similar to a behavioral finance strategy (Fondene, 2011b). 
 
PLUSS AKSJE 
The mutual fund manager of PLUSS Aksje, Fondsforvaltning AS, focus mainly on 
fundamental analysis, but also analyze external factors such as macro events, political 
stability and demographic features when making investments decisions (Fondsforvaltning, 
2011a) 
The fund was established in December 1996 and invests primarily in stocks listed on the 
Norwegian stock market. 20% of the capital may be invested in the global market. The fund 
has a relative free mandate and can be considered as a stock-picking fund with long 
investment horizon, and is benchmarked against OSEFX (Fondsforvaltning, 2011b). 
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WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
The fund has a relative free mandate and picks stocks according to their expectations. This 
also means being style-neutral both in term of segments and relative to the index. By using 
stock picking as their strategy, it may be assumed they are trying to capitalize on some of the 
anomalies created by psychology in the market.  
One could argue that the fund is a conventional active managed fund, but by reading the 
prospectus, I would argue that the free mandate give the fund manager an edge in the market 
utilizing opportunities perhaps created by behavioral biases. This fund does not have as 
strongly characteristics as Delphi Norge, but there are some similarities relative to funds not 
having any similarities, and is therefore included. The prospectus also list a higher than 
average Sharpe Ratio, which indicates less diversification and higher risk.  
 
ODIN NORGE 
ODIN Forvaltning has become one of the largest fund managers in the Norwegian market. 
Their investment approach is to identify companies that reflect popular products, strong cash 
flow, solid balance sheet and high dividends. Their main approach is to find undervalued 
firms in the stock market (OdinFondene, 2011b). In 1992 ODIN Norge was established. The 
fund has more than six billons NOK in capital under management, and is benchmarked 
against OSEFX (OdinFondene, 2011a). 
WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
According to ODIN Norge’s investing prospectus the fund manager describe their investment 
strategy as a continuous search of undervalued stocks under a free mandate. ODIN 
Forvaltning AS makes the following statement about their investment strategy: “Our starting 
point is that it always exists mispriced stocks, and a portfolio of undervalues companies will 
provide excess return over time” (Nils Petter Hollekim). Odin is aware of the presence of 
noise traders in the market, which indicates that they search for investment opportunities 
where they can capitalize on the noise traders. ODIN Norges’s approach of utilizing 
investment opportunities based on mispriced and undervalued stocks, is similar to the 
characteristics of behavioral mutual funds. ODIN Forvaltning further makes the following 
statement: ”The knowledge of stock market psychology may reduce the likelihood of mistakes. 
By taking advantage of a fund manager like ODIN, with long experience in the stock market, 
places a good foundation for the success of your long term saving”. This statement indicates 
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that they include market psychology in their investment decisions, which reflects a behavioral 
strategy approach, though they are not explicitly indicating or directly admits that they are 
assessing a behavioral strategy. Compared to the other funds in the Norwegian market, ODIN 
Norges approach is not necessarily a behavioral fund but has a stronger resemblance with 
respect to a behavioral strategy. ODIN Norge is therefore on this basis included in the 
selection of funds. 
 
Skagen Vekst 
Skagene Fondene is a Stavanger based investment management company with three mutual 
funds and four bond funds. Founded in 1992, with the first fund being launched in 1993, 
Skagen has become one of the largest fund managers in the Norwegian market with over 100 
billion NOK under management. Inspired by Benjamin Graham, Skagen Fondene is using a 
value-based and active investment strategy to earn excess return for the investor 
(SkagenFondene, 2011b). Skagen Fondene incepted the mutual fund Skagen Vekst in 1994 
and has a main goal of identifying companies that are undervalued, under-researched, 
unpopular and using common sense with a broad mandate over a long time horizon, the fund 
managers tries to provide the best risk-adjusted return for the clients (SkagenFondene, 2011a).  
WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
According to Skagen Vekst’s investing prospectus they have an explicit strategy to invest in 
undervalued, under-researched and unpopular stocks. This strategy may indicate that Skagen 
Vekst does not consider the market efficient, and thus accepts the presents of irrational noise 
traders in the market. This acceptance could be used in their favor by utilizing some of the 
anomalies created by psychology. 
By continuously trying to capitalize on undervalued, under-research and unpopular stocks, 
Skagen Vekst is similar to the utilization of the behavioral anomalies of representativeness 
and conservatism in making investments opportunities. As mentioned in section 3.3.4, the 
anomaly of representativeness refers to the fact that investor based their decision on 
stereotypes. The anomaly can create attractive investments opportunities to Skagen since they 
focus on under-researched companies. By formulating an explicit strategy about unpopular 
stocks, Skagen Vekst might also use the argument about affect for investing in unpopular 
stocks is as laid out in section 3.4.6.  
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Based on the investigation of Skagen Vekst prospectus, their investing profile is more 
strongly related to the behavioral anomalies. Similar to the mutual fund managers in ODIN 
Norge, the fund managers in Skagen Vekst do not explicitly admits that they are using a 
behavioral strategy, though they are using an approach related to the anomaly 
representativeness which indicates a behavioral strategy. Compared to ODIN Norge, Skagen 
Vekst reflects stronger similarities to a behavioral strategy than ODIN Norge, though none of 
them directly quotes to a behavioral strategy. Skagen Vekst is therefore also included in the 
selection of funds. 
 
HOLBERG NORGE 
Holberg Fondene is a fund management company based in Bergen, and was established in 
2000. The company is partly owned by partners, which secures stability and continuity among 
key personnel. The company is trying to be the preferred niche player in the fund 
management market, by achieving competitive returns and high focus on client 
communication (HolbergFondene, 2011b). 
Started 28.12.2000, Holberg Norge invests in stocks and equity certificates listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange. The fund has NOK 2.612 mill in capital under management, and up to 20% 
of this amount can be invested abroad. The fund use OSEFX as benchmark index 
(HolbergFondene, 2011a).  
WHY BEHAVIORAL? 
According to the Holberg Fondene’s investing prospectus, they do not believe in efficient 
market and see attractive investments opportunities created by irrational markets and “black 
swans” which may indicate that the fund managers also focus on mispriced stocks. As a style-
neutral and professional stock-picker, the fund managers are freely to choose the stocks they 
like, and not only the ones included in the benchmark index. The main fund manager in 
Holberg Norge, Hogne Tyssøy, follows these investment “rules” when making investing 
decisions. These investment rules may be recognized as a behavioral strategy approach. 
Compared to the other selected funds listed above, Holberg Norge has not as strong 
behavioral characteristics but they do have stronger psychological elements compared to the 
remaining Norwegian fund population. The mutual fund, Holberg Norge, is therefore included 
in the selection of funds. 
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MATCHING FUNDS 
To purpose of this study is also to examine the differences between conventional mutual 
funds and funds with a behavioral strategy. To capture the effect, one large value-fund (DnB 
Norge (1)), one mid-size value/growth fund (Storebrand Norge) and two index funds (PLUSS 
Index and Carnegie Aksje Index) are included in the dataset. These four funds are chosen due 
to their size, style and inception dates. By including a relative large value-fund as proxy for 
the conventional funds, I test that following a value-strategy does not imply following a 
strategy based on behavioral finance. Storebrand Norge is included since it holds a mix of 
value and growth strategy, and can thus be regarded as proxy for both value and growth 
funds. This form of comparing funds is called matching fund analysis and is common when 
comparing different strategies and fund performance, but could also be source of error. One 
cannot be totally sure that the matching and the matched fund are having the same view on the 
market, and the risk profile may also differ. 
To further check for differences between the conventional funds and the one associated with 
behavioral finance, two equally weighted portfolios are created. Ew Bf contains the six 
behavioral mutual funds, and Ew Cf contains the remaining funds in the dataset. 
 
5.3 OSEFX AND THE 1 MONTH NIBOR INTEREST RATE 
To preform the empirical analysis, proxies for the market index and the risk-free rate are 
needed. This section describes the selection of benchmark and interest rate. 
 
5.3.1 OSEFX 
In order to test for abnormal performance a benchmark index is required. The chosen 
benchmark should reflect the funds investments in terms of both risk and composition. Using 
an index as benchmark makes it easy for the investor to compare the performance of the fund 
relative to the benchmark, and thus, see if the fund manager is able to produce abnormal 
returns. The index should also investable for the common investor.  
Most Norwegian mutual funds use either Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX), 
the sub-index Oslo Stock Exchange Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX), but the fund is free to 
choose any benchmark it finds suitable. However, since mutual funds are trying show 
abnormal performance the selection of benchmark could be somewhat biased. I their master 
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thesis both Pedersen and Vorland (2003) and Johannessen and Johansen (2001) showed that 
selection of benchmark affects the abnormal performance. Their findings indicate that 
choosing between OSEBX and OSEFX would affect the beta-values and thus the abnormal 
performance. This is due to the realized market premium being different for the two indexes.  
Since most of the funds in my data sample use the OSEFX as benchmark, I chose to use this 
index as the benchmark. The OSEFX was created 31.08.2001 to be a fair benchmark for the 
Norwegian mutual funds. Since my dataset contains data prior to this date, I use a linked 
OSEFX available on the homepage of Oslo Stock Exchange. The linked OSEFX is able to 
show historical information by using the total index adjusted by an adjustment ratio similar to 
the ratio between the total index and OSEFX at 31.08.2001. 
The only fund in the sample not using OSEFX is Skagen Vekst. Skagen Vekst is using a 
weighted benchmark consisting and OSEBX and MSCI All Country World Index. Prior to 
31.12.09, Skagen Vekst used OSEBX as benchmark. This is important to remember when 
analyzing the empirical results, since the wrong benchmark may affect the results. Skagen 
Vekst has a more international mandate, making it more possible to diversify the investments 
more effectively.  
 
5.3.2 THE 1-MONTH NIBOR 
In order to calculate excess return, a proxy for the risk-free rate is required. I have chosen to 
use the effective 1-month NIBOR (Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate), which is similar to 1-
month T-bills used as risk-free rate in the Fama-French model. Using the 1-month NIBOR 
could be problematic due to the volatility in short time interest rates and the instability when 
markets are turbulent. However, the risk-free rate is always the risk-free alternative, and any 
short time variability is therefore irrelevant. 
The data on the risk-free rate is downloaded from the homepage of Norges Bank1, and is 
converted from yearly to monthly quote, using the following formula: 
 !! = (1+ !!!!)!/!" − 1 (11) 
 
 
 
                                                
1http://www.norges-bank.no/no/prisstabilitet/rentestatistikk/  
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5.4 DATA SAMPLE 
The dataset is obtained from Oslo Børs and contains monthly return from 1993 to 2010. The 
returns are calculated using net-asset values after deducting dividends and yearly 
managements costs. The fund sample is selected based on the information fund managers 
convey to the well-known investment research firm Morningstar. 
The 1-month NIBOR is subtracted from the return each month to yield excess returns, and 
then regressed using both the CAPM and the Carhart four-factor model. The α from the 
intercept, represent the abnormal performance that is not explained by the independent 
variables. The data sample  is regressed using a standard OLS regression 
Ex-post CAPM:  
 
 !!" − !!" = !!" + !! !!" − !!" + !!" (12) 
Carhart four-factor model    
 !!" = !! + !!!"!#! + !!!"#! + ℎ!!"#! + !!!"1!"! + !!" (13) 
 
The data related to SMB, HML and PR1YR in the Norwegian market is downloaded from the 
homepage of Bernt Arne Ødegaard 2. SMBt and HMLt are the returns on the factor portfolios 
created similar to Fama and French (1992) on size and book-to-market in month t. PR1YRt is 
the factor portfolio on the prior one-year momentum for stocks in month t. The factor 
portfolio RMRF is calculated using monthly return on OSEFX minus 1-month NIBOR. 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FACTOR PORTFOLIOS 1993-2010 
Factor portfolio n Mean Standard Deviation 
RMRF 216 .0081 .073 
SMB 216 .0077 .049 
HML 216 .0027 .057 
PR1YR 216 .0043 .049 
Descriptive statistics on factor portfolios in the time period 1993-2010. 
                                                
2 http://finance.bi.no/~bernt/ 
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To test the performance of the funds with a behavioral strategy, three standard performance 
measures are applied: Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio. The measures are 
calculated over the total time period and in three different sub-periods.  
The total time period is 1993-2010. This long period is chosen in order to evaluate the long-
term performance. In order to analyze any changes in performance, the total time period is 
also divided in three sub-periods. The sub-periods are 5-years intervals, and this timeframe is 
chosen since the Norwegian Fund and Asses Management Association recommends a holding 
period of at least 5 years for mutual funds.   
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6.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Section 6.1 present the purpose of the empirical study, and section 6.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for both factor portfolios and the selected funds. Section 6.3 present the empirical 
results examining Jensen’s Alpha after carrying out a traditional regression using the CAPM. 
Section 6.4 presents the empirical results after carrying out regressions using the Carhart four-
factor model. Section 6.5 ranks the funds in the sample according to their Sharpe’s Ratio. In 
section 6.6 the funds are ranked using the Information Ratio and finally section 6.7 will 
contain a discussion and critical remarks of the empirical results. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
While mutual fund performance has been widely discussed, the practical application of 
behavioral finance for mutual funds is more unknown. The purpose of this empirical study is 
to examine whether Norwegian mutual funds associated with behavioral finance are able to 
deliver abnormal returns after controlling for risk, and their ability to outperform index funds. 
A part of the study is also to examine if the funds associated with behavioral finance load 
differently on the factor portfolios in the Carhart four-factor model compared to non-
behavioral funds. 
 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2, page 51, displays the descriptive statistics for factor portfolios over the time period 
1993-2010. The results indicate that the market portfolio has the highest monthly returns, in 
line with the expectations, since the market portfolio holds the highest standard deviation. 
When comparing the portfolios related to size, book-to-market ratio and momentum, the 
statistics indicates that an investment strategy tilted towards small stocks would offer a better 
risk-reward for the investor than begin tilted towards value- or momentum stocks. In fact, by 
investing in the factor portfolio related to size, SMB, the investor would have 0.50% higher 
monthly returns and at the same time less risk, compared to an investment in the HML 
portfolio. Comparing the size and the momentum portfolios shows that the investor would 
have earned 0.34% more monthly returns by investing in the SMB portfolio relative to the 
PR1YR portfolio. These portfolios have the same standard deviation, which indicates that the 
SMB portfolio offered the best risk-reward ratio.  
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FACTOR PORTFOLIOS 1993-1998 
 Factor portfolio n Mean Std. 
RMRF 72 .0104 .061 
SMB 72 .0103 .048 
HML 72 .0064 .055 
PR1YR 72 .0016 .042 
Descriptive statistics on the factor portfolios in the time period 1993-1998 
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics over the sub period 1993-1999. The statistics 
displays some similarities to the total time period. The SMB portfolio had even higher return 
and lower standard deviation in this time period compared to the total time period, making it 
an even better strategy. The portfolio related to value stocks, HML, had higher return at 
almost the same risk level, when comparing to the total time period. However, the return on 
the HML portfolio increased more relative to both the SMB portfolio and the PR1YR 
portfolio, indicating that value stocks outperformed both small stocks and momentum stocks. 
The return on the momentum portfolio was relative low in this period, only showing a 
monthly mean return of 0.16% while maintain almost the same level of risk. One argument 
for the relative strong performance of the SMB portfolio and the relative weak performance of 
the HML portfolio may be related to the business cycle. In the time period 1993 to 1999, the 
market was moving upwards as a result of the technology bubble, and interest rates were high.  
As presented in section 4.2, Zhang (2005) argues that value stocks underperform when the 
market is moving upwards. 
 
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FACTOR PORTFOLIOS 1999-2004 
Factor portfolio n Mean Std. 
RMRF 72 .0046 .068 
SMB 72 .0070 .035 
HML 72 .0084 .055 
PR1YR 72 .0026 .057 
Descriptive statistics on the factor portfolios in the time period 1999-2004 
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistic over the time period from 1999 to 2004. This time 
period contains both a recession and an expansion period. It can be observed that the excess 
return on the market was only 0.46%, down from 0.104% in the prior time period. This is 
clearly a result of the high volatility in the market. On interesting result in this time period is 
the high return on the portfolio related to value stocks, HML. While remaining the same level 
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of risk, the HML portfolio has passed the SMB portfolio as the best portfolio in terms of 
returns. However, when evaluating both risk and return, the SMB portfolio still offers the best 
risk to return ratio.  
 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FACTOR PORTFOLIOS 2005-2010 
Factor portfolio n Mean Std. 
RMRF 72 .0092 .089 
SMB 72 .0019 .060 
HML 72 -.0067 .061 
PR1YR 72 .0088 .046 
Descriptive statistics on the factor portfolios in the time period 2005-2010 
 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistic over the time period from 2005 to 2010. The time 
period was highly volatile, due the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The volatile market explains 
the high standard deviation the RMRF factor. The portfolio did deliver monthly excess return 
of 0.92%, but at the cost of a higher than normal risk profile. Another interesting remark is the 
negative return on the HML portfolio. This indicates that growth stocks outperformed value 
stocks in this time period. Following the argument that risk is the reason why these factor 
portfolios deliver positive returns, the HML factor is associated with risk related financial 
distress. One can argue that under the financial crisis stock with high book-to-market ratio fell 
more than stocks with low book-to-market ratio. This supports to the argument of Fama and 
French (1992) and further Zhang (2006) that value stock underperform relative to growth 
stocks in times when the price of risk is high. In contrast to prior time periods, the factor 
portfolio related to momentum offered the best risk-reward ratio in this period, by having the 
highest return and the lowest standard deviation.  
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TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SELECTED FUNDS 
Fund	   n	   Mean	   Std.	   Min	   Max	  
Skagen	  Vekst	   204	   0.0105	   0.0549	   -­‐0.2059	   0.1551	  
ODIN	  Norge	   216	   0.0121	   0.0700	   -­‐0.2464	   0.2203	  
Pareto	  Aksje	  Norge	   111	   0.0142	   0.0657	   -­‐0.2664	   0.1595	  
Delphi	  Norge	   198	   0.0110	   0.0793	   -­‐0.2553	   0.2250	  
PLUSS	  Aksje	   168	   0.0072	   0.0716	   -­‐0.2611	   0.1724	  
Holberg	  Norge	   120	   0.0093	   0.0712	   -­‐0.2445	   0.1570	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   216	   0.0084	   0.0688	   -­‐0.2938	   0.1652	  
DnBNor	  Norge	  (1)	   216	   0.0073	   0.0652	   -­‐0.2471	   0.1563	  
PLUSS	  Index	   207	   0.0070	   0.0676	   -­‐0.2543	   0.1681	  
Carnegie	  Norge	  Index	   216	   0.0073	   0.0671	   -­‐0.2559	   0.1671	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Equally	  weighted	  portfolio.	  Conventional	  Funds	   216	   0.0089	   0.0649	   -­‐0.2570	   0.1545	  
Equally	  weighted	  portfolio.	  Behavioral	  Funds	   216	   0.0137	   0.0665	   -­‐0.2409	   0.2203	  
Oslo	  Stock	  Exchange	  Mutual	  Fund	  Index	   216	   0.0081	   0.0733	   -­‐0.2882	   0.2016	  
The table displays the descriptive statistics for all funds. Mean is calculated on excess return level and 
denoted as monthly excess return. The return of OSEFX is the same as the factor RMRF. 
 
Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics for the behavioral funds, the matching funds, the 
market benchmark index and the two equally weighted portfolios, on an excess return basis  
It can be observed that Pareto Aksje Norge has the highest mean excess return over the time 
period, followed by ODIN Norge and Delphi Norge. Skagen Vekst has lowest standard 
deviation, followed by Pareto Aksje Norge and ODIN Norge, while Delphi Norge is the fund 
with the highest standard deviation. The market index, OSEFX, has an average monthly 
excess return of 0.0081 or 9.72% annualized. The market outperformed only Pluss Aksje of 
the behavioral funds, but managed to outperform DnBNor Norge (1) and both index funds. 
The equally weighted portfolios of behavioral funds reports both highest excess return and 
highest standard deviation of the two equally weighted portfolios. Both portfolios are able to 
outperform the market, and also have less standard deviation that the market. 
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6.3 ABNORMAL RETURN: CAPM 
In this section a regular CAPM regression is performed to test if the behavioral mutual funds 
are able to generate abnormal returns after controlling for risk. The test is also divided in sub-
periods to examine any changes in performance. 
 
6.3.1 TOTAL TIME PERIOD 
Table 7 contains the results of testing the first hypothesis using the CAPM over the total time 
period, 1993-2010.  
Over the total time period all of the funds have positive alpha values, and thereby higher 
excess returns than predicted by the CAPM. Two of the funds have significant alpha-values 
on a 5% significance level, Odin Norge (ODN), and Pareto Aksje Norge (PAA), while Skagen 
Vekst (SKV) has a significant alpha-value on 1% significance level. 
The index funds PLUSS Index (PI) and Carnegie Norge Index (CNI) have respectively 1.38% 
and 0.39% annualizes alpha-values, but none of them are statistical significant. Since both of 
the index funds are designed to follow the movement on OSEBX the positive alpha could be a 
result of a difference between OSEFX and OSEBX. However, alpha-values that are not 
statistical significant are in line with expectations of the model. 
As for the beta-values, the model produces significant values at a 1% significant level for all 
funds. The beta-values range from 0.635 (SKV) to 0.895 (DNH). The beta-values are relative 
low for index fund, and similar to the alpha-value, the low beta-values could be a result of the 
difference between OSEBX and OSEFX. 
The relative low R2 for ODN and PAA could be an indication that these funds are not 
diversified enough, and holds more unsystematic risk than necessary. However, being a 
behavioral mutual fund might involve taking on extra risk in order to exploit mispricing in the 
market, but one would expect large funds to be diversified enough to fully utilize the 
diversification effect. Since PI is an index fund, one would expect the fund to have a higher 
R2 than 0.87. The low R2 could be due to the low number of observations or the high volatility 
in the market for the selected time-period. 
The two equally weighted portfolios are also regressed over the period, and interesting the Ew 
Bf has a significant monthly excess return of 0.007. This is in contrast to most of the prior 
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studied on fund performance, as described in section 4.0. The equally weighted portfolio of 
conventional funds, Ew Cf, a positive alpha, but this value is not significant.  
In contrast to prior studies (Gjerde & Sættem, 1991; Sørensen, 2009) the results indicates that 
my first hypothesis might be rejected.  
Comparing the results to other master thesis reveals some similarities. Daphu (2007) analyzed 
the time period from 1999 to 2006, and found that Skagen Vekst (0.0075) and Pareto Aksje 
Norge (0.0100) were able to deliver significant alpha.  Myrmel (2008) used the time period 
from 1999 to 2005 and also found Skagen Vekst (0.0089) being able to deliver significant 
alpha at 1% level. Tveito (2006) analyzed the period from 1998-2005, and found that Holberg 
Norge was able to deliver significant alpha at 5% significant level, while Pareto Aksje Norge 
was able to deliver significant alpha at 1% significant level.  
Since three out of six funds deliver associated with behavioral finance are able to deliver 
significant abnormal returns, this could be an indication that behavioral finance is somewhat 
useful in portfolio management. However, it is important to remember that CAPM only 
captures the systematic risk related to the market, and further analysis might give different 
results when adding more risk-sources.    
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TABLE 7: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CAPM 1993-2010 
1993-­‐2010	  
Ticker	   α Annualized-­‐α	   β R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.006**	   7.72	  %	   0.635**	   0.73	   204	  
	   (3.22)	   	   (28.56)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.006*	   6.87	  %	   0.788**	   0.68	   216	  
	   (2.11)	   	   (21.31)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.008*	   9.00	  %	   0.659**	   0.70	   111	  
	   (2.17)	   	   (15.91)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.005	   5.82	  %	   0.894**	   0.71	   198	  
	   (1.58)	   	   (21.78)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.002	   2.81	  %	   0.827**	   0.84	   168	  
	   (1.04)	   	   (29.13)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.004	   5.39	  %	   0.761**	   0.79	   120	  
	   (1.49)	   	   (21.00)	   	   	  
PI	   0.001	   1.37	  %	   0.850**	   0.87	   207	  
	   (0.66)	   	   (36.46)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.000	   0.39	  %	   0.855**	   0.87	   216	  
	   (0.20)	   	   (38.04)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eq	  Cf	   0.002	   2.60	  %	   0.825**	   0.87	   216	  
	   (1.34)	   	   (37.42)	   	   	  
Eq	  Bf	   0.007**	   8.75	  %	   0.793**	   0.76	   216	  
	   (3.28)	   	   (26.23)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
The estimated alpha- and beta-values are the regression coefficient from the CAPM. The dependent 
variable is portfolio return above the risk-free rate for all funds. T-values are indicated in the line 
below the regression estimates (grey line). The t-value are tested against α=0 and β=0 
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6.3.2 SUB PERIODS  
In this section the results of the different sub periods is presented, in order to give a more in-
depth understanding of the funds performance. 
Table 8 contains the CAPM regression over the time period 1993-1998. Since behavioral 
finance is a rather new discipline, one could expect the funds to have had a different strategy 
in this period time-period than today, and thus obtain different results. 
Only Skagen Vekst (SKV) has significant alpha in this period, but all of the behavioral funds 
performed better than estimated by the CAPM model. The two index fund has negative alpha 
in this period, but none of the results are statistical significant.  
The beta-values in this period are highly volatile and SKV has a beta-value of only 0.52. This 
could be due to the fact that SKV was incepted 01.1994, and has only 60 month of trading 
activity in this period. ODN has an estimated beta-value of 0.93 in this time period, in contrast 
to the beta-value of 0.788 for the whole period, 1993-2010. The R2 for ODN is about the same 
in this period, as for the whole period, which could indicates that the fund simply follows the 
index to a larger extend or is more diversified, lowering the unsystematic risk.  
The equally weighted portfolio of behavioral funds performed extremely well in this period, 
earning an annualized alpha of 13.06%, but the portfolio has a low R2 , and could hold a lot of 
unsystematic risk. Compared to the equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds, the 
behavioral portfolio earned over 10% annualized alpha more than the conventional portfolio 
in this time period. 
The results in this period make it difficult to give a clear conclusion regarding the hypothesis 
of behavioral fund delivering abnormal returns. While three out of four funds does not deliver 
significant abnormal returns, the equally weighted portfolio does. I would argue that due to 
the low number observations for two of the funds in the sample, the result regarding the 
equally weighted portfolio of behavioral funds must be used with caution. 
 
Table 9 displays the result from the CAPM regression over time period 1999 to 2004. 
In this period all of the funds in the sample have positive alpha values and three, Skagen 
Vekst, Odin Norge and Pareto Aksje Norge, of the behavioral funds have a significant alpha 
value. All of the behavioral funds seem to have performed exceptionally good in this time 
period, especially when comparing to equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds. The 
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behavioral funds also outperformed the index funds PI and CNI, as expected, in the matter of 
alpha. The beta-values are in this time-period generally higher than in the prior time period. 
This could be seen as an adjustment of the risk towards systematic risk, rather than 
unsystematic risk. The high beta-values also correspond to the higher R2 .  
The time period 01.1999 to 12.2004 was a highly volatile period containing both an expansion 
and a recession period. After the IT-bubble and the terrorist attack in September 2001 the 
economy fell into recession, and the stock market fell deeply and was over halved during the 
period from 09.2000 to 03.2003. Following the recession, the market quickly recovered and 
expands heavily from 04.2003 and to the end of this time period. During this expansion the 
market recovered all of the loss from the recession and expanded even further. This might 
explain some of the great returns. 
 
Table 10 contains the estimated beta and alpha values from the CAPM in the time period 
2005-2010. 
In this time period all funds in the sample have positive alpha values, but none of the values 
holds as statistical significant. Pareto Aksje Norge and Holberg Norge are to the two best-
performing funds delivering annualized alpha of 7.47% and 6.65%, while Odin Norge is the 
worst performing fund, delivering only 2.41 % annualized alpha. Also in this period the index 
funds perform better than estimated by CAPM, but the result are, as expected, not statistical 
significant.  
The beta values have changed quite much compared to earlier sub-periods and the total time 
period, and all funds have smaller beta values compared to 1994-2004. This could be an 
indication that funds reduce their exposure to the volatility in the market in volatile times. The 
low beta value can also be a result of the funds holding more of their capital in cash or 
investing in the risk-free alternative.  
The R2 is fairly similar in this period to the overall period of 1993-2010, but both HBN and 
ODN have relative small R2 meaning they are less diversified. 
In the discussion regarding behavioral finance and convection funds, Ew Bf again seems to 
outperform the Ew Cf, but none of the alpha values are found to be statistical significant 
different from zero, and thus the null hypothesis testing α=0 fails to be rejected. 
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TABLE 8: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CAPM: 1993-1998 
1993-­‐1998	  
Ticker	   α Annualized-­‐α	   β R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.008*	   9.26	  %	   0.521**	   0.59	   60	  
	   (2.24)	   	   (9.31)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.006	   6.78	  %	   0.939**	   0.68	   72	  
	   (1.20)	   	   (12.28)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.006	   6.83	  %	   0.835**	   0.62	   54	  
	   (1.02)	   	   (9.36)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.005	   5.83	  %	   0.924**	   0.73	   24	  
	   (0.61)	   	   (8.02)	   	   	  
PI	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐1.72	  %	   0.962**	   0.90	   63	  
	   (-­‐0.57)	   	   (23.67)	   	   	  
CNI	   -­‐0.003	   -­‐3.17	  %	   0.952**	   0.90	   72	  
	   (-­‐1.17)	   	   (25.94)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eq	  Cf	   0.002	   2.57	  %	   0.823**	   0.86	   72	  
	   (0.88)	   	   (20.78)	   	   	  
Eq	  Bf	   0.011*	   13.06	  %	   0.871**	   0.66	   72	  
	   (2.42)	   	   (11.89)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
The estimated alpha- and beta-values are the regression coefficient from the CAPM. The dependent 
variable is portfolio return above the risk-free rate for all funds. T-values are indicated in the line 
below the regression estimates (grey line). The t-value are tested against a=0 and b=0. 
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TABLE 9: ABNORMAL RETURNS CAPM: 1999-2004 
1999-­‐2004	  
Ticker	   α Annualized-­‐α	   β R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.008*	   10.03	  %	   0.808**	   0.80	   72	  
	   (2.60)	   	   (16.95)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.009*	   10.47	  %	   0.969**	   0.78	   72	  
	   (2.12)	   	   (15.81)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.009*	   10.95	  %	   0.716**	   0.77	   72	  
	   (1.97)	   	   (11.20)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.005	   5.66	  %	   1.183**	   0.76	   72	  
	   (0.90)	   	   (15.10)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.001	   1,04	  %	   0,9443**	   0,88	   72	  
	   (0.310)	   	   (22.74)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.004	   4,57	  %	   0.963**	   0.89	   48	  
	   (1,040)	   	   (19,31)	   	   	  
PI	   0.002	   2.60	  %	   0.888**	   0.92	   72	  
	   (1.04)	   	   (28.54)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.001	   1.30	  %	   0.899**	   0.93	   72	  
	   (0.53)	   	   (29.80)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eq	  Cf	   0.001	   1.72	  %	   0.947**	   0.92	   72	  
	   (0.63)	   	   (27.83)	   	   	  
Eq	  Bf	   0.006*	   7.65	  %	   0.950**	   0.88	   72	  
	   (2.25)	   	   (22.54)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
The estimated alpha- and beta-values are the regression coefficient from the CAPM. The dependent 
variable is portfolio return above the OSEFX for all funds. T-values are indicated in the line below the 
regression estimates (grey line). The t-value are tested against a=0 and b=0. 
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TABLE 10: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CAPM: 2005-2010 
2005-­‐2010	  
Ticker	   α Annualized-­‐α	   β R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.004	   4.35	  %	   0.5821*	   0.773	   72	  
	   (1.090)	   	   (15.570)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.0020	   2.41	  %	   0.6137*	   0.661	   72	  
	   (0.430)	   	   (11.820)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.0064	   7.74	  %	   0.6387*	   0.669	   72	  
	   (1.360)	   	   (12.010)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.0046	   5.58	  %	   0.7507*	   0.762	   72	  
	   (1.050)	   	   (15.120)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.0033	   3.98	  %	   0.7316*	   0.873	   72	  
	   (1.130)	   	   (22.130)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.0055	   6.65	  %	   0.6693*	   0.749	   72	  
	   (1.360)	   	   (14.600)	   	   	  
PI	   0.0011	   1.37	  %	   0.8500*	   0.866	   72	  
	   (0.660)	   	   (36.460)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.0020	   2.38	  %	   0.7846*	   0.824	   72	  
	   (0.520)	   	   (18.260)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Eq	  Cf	   0.0030	   3.64	  %	   0.7550*	   0.847	   72	  
	   (0.900)	   	   (19.860)	   	   	  
Eq	  Bf	   0.0043	   5.12	  %	   0.6644*	   0.792	   72	  
	   (1.190)	   	   (16.480)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
The estimated alpha- and beta-values are the regression coefficient from the CAPM. The dependent 
variable is portfolio return above the OSEFX for all funds. T-values are indicated in the line below the 
regression estimates. The t-value are tested against a=0 and b=0.  
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6.4 ABNORMAL RETURNS: CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL 
In this section the results of testing the funds for abnormal performance using the Carhart four 
factor is presented. The testing is conducted over the total time period, as well as sub periods 
in order to evaluate the hypotheses formed in the introduction . 
 
6.4.1 TOTAL TIME PERIOD 
Table 11 contains the results of estimating Carhart (1997) four-factor model for risk over the 
total sample period ranging from January 1993 to December 2010. The parameter estimates 
and corresponding t-values and p-values are regressed using the following equation: 
 !!" = !! + !!!"!#! + !!!"#! + ℎ!!"#! + !!!"1!"! + !!" (14) 
The estimated intercept, which represent abnormal return, is positive for all funds, but only 
statistical significant for Skagen Vekst (0.005). However, Skagen Vekst is the only fund 
having a different benchmark and the fund has a boarder investment mandate, which could 
indicate that the realization abroad has contributed to the good performance of the fund. Since 
only one of the behavioral funds show significant alpha-value, this indicates that on an 
aggregate level, it is possible to conclude that the testing fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
H1, that behavioral mutual funds earn zero abnormal returns. The equally weighted portfolio 
also supports this conclusion, not having a statistical significant alpha value. These findings 
are in line with the results from earlier testing, both on behavioral mutual fund and on 
conventional mutual fund both under CAPM and the Carhart model (Burton, 1995; Gjerde & 
Sættem, 1991; Sørensen, 2009; Wermers, 2000; Wright, et al., 2006). Using the Carhart 
model on an equally weighted portfolio for the time period 1986 to 2009, Sørensen (2009) 
reports a monthly alpha of 0.002, which is quite similar to my result on the equally weighted 
portfolio of conventional funds delivering monthly alpha of 0.001. The equally weighted 
portfolio consisting of the behavioral funds deliver slightly higher alpha, 0.004, but none of 
the values are found to be statistical significant.  
The market coefficient varies from 0.693 (Skagen Vekst) to 0.987 (Delphi Norge). Only two 
of six behavioral mutual funds have higher market coefficient than the matching funds, which 
could indicates that the behavioral mutual funds invest more freely regarding the market 
index. Since the results display that behavioral funds, on an aggregate level, have a higher 
beta coefficient than the conventional funds, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions 
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regarding the differences. Another interesting observation is the relative low coefficient of the 
index funds, respectively 0.847 (Pluss Index) and 0.847 (Carnegie Norge Index). This could 
be a result of the index funds tracking the OSEBX while they are tested against the OSEFX. 
The coefficient for SMB factor has high variability, both for the behavioral mutual funds and 
the matching funds. It ranges from -0.054 (CNI) to 0.378 (ODN). A positive coefficient on the 
SMB factor indicates going long small stocks and short large stocks. Five out of six 
behavioral mutual funds have statistical significant factor loading on the SMB factor, 
compared to only one of the matched and index funds.  
On the HML factor almost all of the funds have positive coefficients, but only the coefficients 
of ODN and PAA holds as significant at 5% level. The significant values of PAA and ODN 
are in line with the expectation since both funds use value investing as a part in their 
investments strategy. Having a positive (negative) coefficient indicates going long (short) 
stocks with low (high) book-to-market ratio. DHN is the only fund having a negative 
coefficient. The results at the HML factor can be compared, at an aggregated level, to the 
findings of Sørensen (2008). While he reports a negative factor loading on the HML factor, 
my result shows a significant positive value, and this could be an indication that there is a 
difference between behavioral and non-behavioral funds. My results are similar to the finding 
of Wright et al. (2006), which also reports a significant coefficient on the HML factor.  
On the momentum none of the funds have significant coefficients. This indicates that none of 
the funds systematically use momentum as a part of their strategy. However, the results shows 
that four out of six behavioral find have negative coefficient on the momentum factor, 
indicating going long prior losers and short prior winners. This is in line with reversal effect 
discovered by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). The result also indicates that Delphi Norge, which 
has defined momentum as part of their investments strategy, does not seem to statistically 
follow this strategy. However, this could be a result of the long time period, whereas Delphi 
uses more short-term momentum.  
The results displays that the systematic risk, R2, range from 0.70 to 0.90. Compared to the 
result of Wright et al. (2006), R2 seems to be about the same, but with a lower maximum 
value. At the aggregate level, my results also seem to have a lower R2 than the result from 
Sørensen (2009) both on the equally weighted portfolio of conventional and on the equally 
weighted portfolio of behavioral funds. This could a result of the selection of risk-free rate or 
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the selected time period. Also compared to Reizer (2010) and Hoel (2010), my results show a 
lower R2, but this could be a result of different benchmarks or the time periods selected. 
 
In short summary of my results, I view my results providing support to earlier studies. The 
empirical results indicate that behavioral funds are not able to deliver abnormal returns after 
controlling for risk, hence, H1 fails to be rejected.  
The results further indicate that funds associated with behavioral finance, load differently than 
conventional funds on the HML factor in the Carhart (1997) model. Two of the behavioral 
funds have significant coefficients on the HML factor, which could be an indication that my 
second hypothesis is fails to be rejected, and that behavioral and non-behavioral funds load 
differently on the Carhart factors. I will also argue that the equally weighted portfolio has a 
significant factor loading on the HML factor, a further indication that behavioral mutual funds 
are more into value investing. Wright et al. (2006) also find significant coefficient on the 
HML factor, both with an equally weighed and a value-weighted portfolio. Their result then 
supports my finding that behavioral funds are indeed more into value investing than 
conventional funds. However, as mention earlier, it is important to remember the small 
sample and both the rational and the behavioral explanation for value investing. 
The lack of prior studies using the Carhart model in the Norwegian market makes it difficult 
to compare the results for the factor loadings. At the aggregate level my results displays a 
significant positive factor loading on the SMB factor both on the portfolio of conventional 
and behavioral funds, in contrast to Sørensen (2009) and Wright et al. (2006) who reports 
insignificant factor loading on SMB.  
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TABLE 11: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL: 1993-2010 
Ticker	   α  β  s	   h	   u	   Adj.	  R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.005**	   0.693**	   0.197*	   0.046	   -­‐0.052	   0.74	   204	  
	   (2.67)	   (20.67)	   3.46	   (1.08)	   (-­‐1.24)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.002	   0.903**	   0.378*	   0.220**	   -­‐0.067	   0.74	   216	  
	   (0.61)	   (22.76)	   (6.27)	   (4.75)	   (-­‐1.29)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.006	   0.743**	   0.165*	   0.164*	   0.067	   0.70	   111	  
	   (1.70)	   (13.12)	   (1.73)	   (2.15)	   (0.97)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.002	   0.987**	   0.306*	   -­‐0.084	   0.041	   0.74	   198	  
	   (0.79)	   (19.6)	   (3.57)	   (-­‐1.29)	   (0.67)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.002	   0.855**	   0.102	   0.014	   -­‐0.035	   0.84	   168	  
	   (0.88)	   (22.74)	   (1.61)	   (0.29)	   (-­‐0.76)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.004	   0.829**	   0.202*	   0.082	   -­‐0.047	   0.79	   120	  
	   (1.25)	   (16.63)	   (2.35)	   (1.26)	   (-­‐0.76)	   	   	  
STBN	   0.000	   0.909**	   0.097*	   0.033	   -­‐0.007	   0.88	   216	  
	   (0.16)	   (34.01)	   (2.38)	   (1.07)	   (-­‐0.19)	   	   	  
DNBN	   0.000	   0.846**	   0.026	   0.010	   0.016	   0.88	   216	  
	   (0.09)	   (33.70)	   (0.69)	   (0.36)	   (0.49)	   	   	  
PI	   0.001	   0.847**	   -­‐0.030	   0.027	   0.028	   0.87	   207	  
	   (0.63)	   (28.55)	   (-­‐0.599	   (0.72)	   (0.75)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.001	   0.845**	   -­‐0.054	   0.017	   0.035	   0.87	   216	  
	   (0.36)	   (31.88)	   (-­‐1.33)	   (0.57)	   (1.02)	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.001	   0.865**	   0.122*	   0.004	   0.021	   0.87	   216	  
	   (0.48)	   (33.81)	   (3.13)	   (0.14)	   (0.64)	   	   	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.004	   0.894**	   0.338*	   0.131**	   -­‐0.049	   0.80	   216	  
	   (1.77)	   (27.63)	   (6.86)	   (3.47)	   (-­‐1.16)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
Table 11 contains the parameter estimates and the corresponding t-values from estimating the 
Carhart model on each fund. The estimated intercept represents the risk-adjusted abnormal 
performance. s, h and u are the regression coefficient of the three factor portfolios, SMB, HML and 
PR1YR, while β, is the regression coefficient regarding RMRF 
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6.4.2 SUB PERIODS 
To further analyze the regression over the Carhart four-factor model, it is interesting to see if 
any of the factor loading change heavily during different time period. Testing the funds in 
different time periods could also be regarded as test for persistence and robustness.  
Table 12 contains the regression results of estimating Carhart (1997) four-factor model over 
the sample period ranging from 1993 to 1998.  
In this time period only SKV and PLA of the behavioral funds have positive intercepts, while 
all of the other funds have negative intercept. The best performing fund was SKV with a 
monthly alpha of 0.004, while ODN and PLA were the worst performing funds delivering 
monthly alpha of -0.003. However, none of the intercepts are significant and thus adds further 
support to the final conclusion, failing to reject the null hypothesis. Three (SKV, ODN and 
DHN) out of the four behavioral funds deliver less alpha in this time period compared to the 
total time period, and also the equally weighted portfolio of behavioral funds, Ew Bf, delivers 
less alpha.  
Three of the funds (ODN, DHN and PLA) have market coefficients higher than 1, meaning 
they are more exposed to the volatility in the market. The result is similar to the results of 
Wright et al. (2006), which found the behavioral funds having universally high loadings on 
the market coefficient, approximately of 1. Compared to the total time period, three funds 
have an increase in the market coefficient, while the last fund, SKV, has a decrees. This could 
indicate that the funds were willing to take on more risk to capture the great development in 
the market. At the aggregate level, both equally weighted portfolios have an increased market 
coefficient. The increase is more prominent for the portfolio of behavioral funds, having a 
market coefficient of 0.966 in this time period, compared to 0.894 for the total time period.  
The SMB coefficients in this period are generally higher compared to the total time period. 
Three (SKV, ODN and PLA) out of the four behavioral funds have higher coefficients, and 
also the both equally weighted portfolios have increased their loading on the SMB factor. 
Having a higher coefficient on the SMB factor indicates that the funds are more into stocks 
with low market capitalization in this time period.  
For the HML factor, three funds (ODN, DHN and PLA) have reduced their coefficient 
compared to the total time period, meaning they are less into stock with high book-to-market 
ratio. Three of the funds have still significant values on the HML factor, leading to the equally 
weighted portfolio also having significant value. At the aggregate level, the absolute value of 
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the coefficient is even higher in this period, compared to the total time period, supporting the 
decision of behavioral fund in the sample are value-oriented. The portfolio of conventional 
funds has an insignificant value, which adds further support to the result that conventional and 
behavioral fund do load differently on the HML factor. 
For the momentum factor PR1YR, two funds (SKV and DHN) have increased coefficient 
compared to the total time period, meaning they are more into stock with good prior 
performance. However, only ODIN Norge has a significant coefficient on the momentum 
factor. At the aggregate level, also the portfolio of conventional funds has a significant value. 
This indicates that conventional funds used the momentum strategy in this period. 
Table 13 contains the regression results of estimating Carhart (1997) four-factor model over 
the sample period ranging from 1999 to 2004. 
In this time period all funds have positive alpha-values, but only the result of Skagen Vekst 
(0.009) holds as statistical significant. The alpha values are higher or fairly similar in this 
period, compared to the prior period and the total period, and the coefficient ranges from 
0.009 (SKV) to 0.000 (STBN). The equally weighted portfolio of behavioral funds, also 
delivers significant alpha, in contrast to prior studies and my main conclusion. The results in 
this period also add support to the conclusion that behavioral funds are able to outperform 
index funds and non-behavioral funds.  
Comparing this period to prior periods reveals only small differences in terms of factor 
loadings. The period contains only a few significant values that are worth commenting: None 
of the funds hold significant values on the SMB factor, indicating that none of the funds used 
the size-premium in this period. Further, on the HML only PAA and DHN holds positive 
significant coefficients, in line with the expectations considering the funds profile about value 
investing. In contrast, the equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds holds a significant 
negative coefficient, similar the findings of Sørensen (2009). On the momentum factor 
PR1YR, only PLA has a significant coefficient and, in line with the expectations about 
reversal found by De Bondt et al. (1985), the coefficient is negative. 
The R2 is higher for all funds in this period when comparing to the total period, indicating the 
funds being more diversified.  
 
Table 14 contains the regression results of estimating Carhart (1997) four-factor model over 
the sample period ranging from 2005 to 2010.  
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In this time period all funds have positive intercepts for alpha, but none holds as statistical 
significant. This could be a result of the highly volatile market in this period. This notion is 
further backed by the decrease of the adjusted R2. Four of the behavioral funds have lower R2 
in this time period, and all of the funds in the sample have seen a decrease in R2. A low R2 is 
an indication of low diversification in the funds, which indicates that the funds have taken on 
more unsystematic risk in this period. This must also be seen against the market coefficients. 
All funds recued their market coefficient from the prior time period, and also have lover 
market coefficient than for the total time period. This may indicate that the funds reduced 
their overall diversification because of the volatility in the market or held more of their funds 
in cash or bonds, as suggested by Gjerde and Sættem (1991) 
Comparing this period to the prior period reveals only small differences in terms of factor 
loadings. However, the only significant value is the SMB coefficient for ODN, which could 
indicate the funds being more tilted toward a general index strategy, since none of them are 
statistically significantly using the factor portfolios.  
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TABLE 12: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL: 1993-1998 
Ticker	   α  β  s	   h	   u	   Adj.	  R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.004	   0.585**	   0.234*	   0.250**	   0.189	   0.67	   60	  
	   (1.28)	   (9.66)	   (2.21)	   (3.00)	   (1.95)	   	   	  
ODN	   -­‐0.003	   1.002**	   0.452**	   0.210**	   -­‐0.191*	   0.81	   72	  
	   (-­‐0,650)	   (15.44)	   (5.63)	   (3.02)	   (-­‐2.15)	   	   	  
DHN	   -­‐0.003	   1.020**	   -­‐0.130	   0.496**	   0.306*	   0.77	   54	  
	   (-­‐0.64)	   (11.74)	   (-­‐1.03)	   (3.20)	   (2.28)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.004	   1.145**	   0.617**	   -­‐0.221	   -­‐0.174	   0.81	   24	  
	   (0.47)	   (8.65)	   (2.60)	   (-­‐1.02)	   (-­‐0.75)	   	   	  
STBN	   -­‐0.001	   0.910**	   0.152	   0.076	   0.041	   0.85	   72	  
	   (-­‐0.38)	   (18.69)	   (2.52)	   (1.46)	   (0.62)	   	   	  
DNBN	   -­‐0.003	   0.856**	   0.061	   0.037	   0.043	   0.90	   72	  
	   (-­‐1.14)	   (23.20)	   (1.34)	   (0.94)	   (0.85)	   	   	  
PI	   -­‐0.002	   0.947**	   0.007	   0.112	   0.043	   0.90	   63	  
	   (-­‐0.62)	   (19.34)	   (0.97)	   (0.062)	   (0.541)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.001	   0.845**	   -­‐0.054	   0.017	   0.035	   0.87	   72	  
	   (0.36)	   (31.88)	   (-­‐1.33)	   (0.57)	   (1.02)	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   -­‐0.002	   0.874**	   0.190**	   0.048	   0.116*	   0.88	   72	  
	   (-­‐0.67)	   (21.92)	   (3.86)	   (1.14)	   (2.31)	   	   	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.002	   0.966**	   0.498**	   0.170*	   -­‐0.061	   0.80	   72	  
	   (0.47)	   (15.46)	   (6.45)	   (2.54)	   (-­‐0.71)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
Table 12 contains the parameter estimates and the corresponding t-values from estimating the 
Carhart model on each fund in the time period 1993-1998. The estimated intercept α represents the 
risk-adjusted abnormal performance. s, h and u are the regression coefficient of the three factor 
portfolios, SMB, HML and PR1YR, while β, is the regression coefficient regarding RMRF. . T-values 
are indicated in the line below the regression estimates, and are tested against α=0, β=0, s=0 h=0, 
u=0. 
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TABLE 13: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL: 1999-2004 
Ticker	   α  β  s	   h	   u	   Adj.	  R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.009*	   0.784**	   0.076	   -­‐0.073	   -­‐0.057	   0.80	   72	  
	   (2.50)	   (12.87)	   (0.67)	   (-­‐1.01)	   (-­‐0.93)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.006	   1.039**	   0.115	   0.147	   0.030	   0.78	   72	  
	   (1.40)	   (13.18)	   (0.78)	   (1.58)	   (0.38)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.005	   0.787**	   0.041	   0.267*	   0.086	   0.80	   39	  
	   (0.96)	   (8.98)	   (0.24)	   (2.09)	   (0.97)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.006	   1.134**	   0.276	   -­‐0.296*	   -­‐0.058	   0.81	   72	  
	   (1.11)	   (12.64)	   (1.64)	   (-­‐2.79)	   (-­‐0.65)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.002	   0.898**	   -­‐0.029	   -­‐0.011	   -­‐0.117*	   0.88	   72	  
	   (0.56)	   (17.09)	   (-­‐0.30)	   (-­‐0.17)	   (-­‐2.23)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.004	   0.964**	   0.118	   -­‐0.052	   -­‐0.048	   0.89	   48	  
	   (1.12)	   (13.12)	   (0.76)	   (-­‐0.55)	   (-­‐0.60)	   	   	  
STBN	   0.000	   0.941**	   -­‐0.065	   -­‐0.067	   -­‐0.037	   0.94	   72	  
	   (0.21)	   (24.27)	   (-­‐0.90)	   (-­‐1.46)	   (-­‐0.95)	   	   	  
DNBN	   0.001	   0.913**	   -­‐0.100	   -­‐0.051	   -­‐0.029	   0.94	   72	  
	   (0.73)	   (25.93)	   (-­‐1.52)	   (-­‐1.22)	   (-­‐0.83)	   	   	  
PI	   0.003	   0.851**	   -­‐0.118	   -­‐0.031	   -­‐0.023	   0.92	   72	  
	   (1.53)	   (21.30)	   (-­‐1.59)	   (-­‐0.65)	   (-­‐0.56)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.003	   0.858**	   -­‐0.136	   -­‐0.033	   -­‐0.021	   0.93	   72	  
	   (1.17)	   (22.34)	   (-­‐1.9)	   (-­‐0.74)	   (-­‐0.55)	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.002	   0.914**	   0.022	   -­‐0.122*	   -­‐0.012	   0.92	   72	  
	   (1.04)	   (21.85)	   (0.28)	   (-­‐2.46)	   (-­‐0.29)	   	   	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.006*	   0.941**	   0.083	   -­‐0.066	   -­‐0.019	   0.88	   72	  
	   (2.10)	   (17.47)	   (0.93)	   (-­‐1.04)	   (-­‐0.36)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
Table 13 contains the parameter estimates and the corresponding t-values from estimating the 
Carhart model on each fund in the time period 1999-2004. The estimated intercept α represents the 
risk-adjusted abnormal performance. s, h and u are the regression coefficient of the three factor 
portfolios, SMB, HML and PR1YR, while β, is the regression coefficient regarding RMRF. . T-values 
are indicated in the line below the regression estimates, and are tested against α=0, β=0, s=0 h=0, 
u=0. 
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TABLE 14: ABNORMAL RETURNS: CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL: 2005-2010 
Ticker	   α  β  s	   h	   u	   Adj.	  R2	   n	  
SKV	   0.004	   0.642**	   0.150	   0.079	   -­‐0.027	   0.77	   72	  
	   (1.04)	   (12.38)	   (1.76)	   (1.13)	   (-­‐0.36)	   	   	  
ODN	   0.001	   0.73**	   0.272*	   0.153	   0.014	   0.67	   72	  
	   (0.38)	   (10.31)	   (2.35)	   (1.61)	   (0.14)	   	   	  
PAA	   0.006	   0.717**	   0.169	   0.130	   0.039	   0.67	   72	  
	   (1.22)	   (9.67)	   (1.39)	   (1.30)	   (0.37)	   	   	  
DHN	   0.003	   0.851**	   0.190	   0.131	   0.168	   0.77	   72	  
	   (1.76)	   (12.67)	   (1.73)	   (1.45)	   (1.76)	   	   	  
PLA	   0.003	   0.754**	   0.024	   0.063	   0.075	   0.87	   72	  
	   (0.93)	   (16.34)	   (0.32)	   (1.01)	   (1.14)	   	   	  
HBN	   0.005	   0.763**	   0.198	   0.15	   0.069	   0.76	   72	  
	   (1.14)	   (12.16)	   (1.93)	   (1.77)	   (0.77)	   	   	  
STBN	   0.002	   0.861**	   0.084	   0.075	   0.072	   0.88	   72	  
	   (0.61)	   (15.49)	   (0.92)	   (1.00)	   (0.91)	   	   	  
DNBN	   0.002	   0.785**	   0.013	   0.043	   0.133	   0.83	   72	  
	   (0.45)	   (14.0)	   (0.14)	   (0.57)	   (1.67)	   	   	  
PI	   0.001	   0.767**	   -­‐0.067	   -­‐0.013	   0.113	   0.82	   72	  
	   (0.34)	   (12.74)	   (-­‐0.68)	   (-­‐0.16)	   (1.32)	   	   	  
CNI	   0.001	   0.771**	   -­‐0.069	   -­‐0.010	   0.127	   0.82	   72	  
	   (0.27)	   (12.9)	   (-­‐0.71)	   (-­‐0.12)	   (1.49)	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.002	   0.800**	   0.081	   0.068	   0.080	   0.85	   72	  
	   (0.64)	   (15.07)	   (0.93)	   (0.95)	   (1.06)	   	   	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.004	   0.743**	   0.167	   0.118	   0.056	   0.88	   72	  
	   (0.96)	   (13.40)	   (1.84)	   (1.58)	   (0.72)	   	   	  
**SIGNIFICANT ON 1% LEVEL, * SIGNIFICANT ON 5% LEVEL 
Table 14 contains the parameter estimates and the corresponding t-values from estimating the 
Carhart model on each fund in the time period 2005-2010. The estimated intercept α represents the 
risk-adjusted abnormal performance. s, h and u are the regression coefficient of the three factor 
portfolios, SMB, HML and PR1YR, while β, is the regression coefficient regarding RMRF. . T-values 
are indicated in the line below the regression estimates, and are tested against α=0, β=0, s=0 h=0, 
u=0. 
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6.4.3 SUMMARY OF THE SUB PERIODS 
The result from the regressions over the different sub periods are interesting: Firstly, some of 
the funds seems to be consistent in term of factor loading, and have only small variations over 
the different time periods, while other shift factor loading quite remarkably. PAA seems to 
have a consistent strategy, and has only small variation regarding the factor loadings, while 
PLA and DHN deviate more. From the period 1999-2004 to the period 2005-2010 PLA shift 
their factor loading from negative to positive regarding the SMB, HML and the PR1YR 
portfolios. Using the rational approach to combine SMB, HML and PR1YR with their 
respective risk, changes in factor loading may be regarded as changes in risk. Huang et al. 
(2010) argues that risk shifting could be a result of agency issues or the activeness of the fund 
manager. The general conclusion is that risk shifting is harmful for the investor and should be 
avoided.  However, since both the equally weighted portfolios also seems to be subject to 
changes of factor loading, I would argue that risk shifting is quite common under active 
portfolio management. Risk shifting could also be argument for superior skills of the fund 
manager, since the manager is using the skills to change stock selections or utilizing timing 
abilities (J. C. Huang, et al., 2010). 
Secondly, the results of the different sub-periods add support to the conclusion that behavioral 
funds load differently than conventional funds on of the factor portfolios. This can be 
observed from the results on the two equally weighted portfolios, and the differences between 
the behavioral funds and the matching funds. 
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6.5 SHARPE RATIO 
Table 15 contains the calculations of the Sharpe Ratio for the total time period and for all sub-
periods. 
By ranking the funds according to Sharpe Ratio, the investor is able to analyze fund 
performance in terms of total risk. A fund can have higher returns than other funds, but is only 
a good investment if the higher returns are not a result of higher risk.  
Over the total period five out of the six behavioral funds are able to outperform both the 
market and the two matching funds. It can be observed that Pareto Aksje Norge (PAA) has the 
highest Sharpe Ratio, 0.2054, followed by Skagen Vekst (SKV) (0.1907) and ODIN Norge 
(ODN) (0.1738). The worst performing fund is PLUSS Aksje (PLA) with a Sharpe Ratio 
0.098 and the fund is thereby outperformed by both the index funds and the market index. The 
market index is ranked as number ten, and has a Sharpe Ratio of 0.1112 
Examining the sub-periods reveals variation in the ranking, and thus only slightly persistence 
in the performance. ODN being the second best fund in the two first periods ranks only as 
number eight in the last time period, but still managed to outperform the market. Since the sub 
periods are five-years intervals, the investor should not use prior performance as an indicator 
for future performance, due to the variations in the raking. 
The equally weighted portfolios of conventional funds, Ew Cf, and the equally weighted 
portfolio of behavioral finds, Ew Bf, rank six and first and both portfolios outperform the 
market, the matching funds and the index funds. This is in line with the expectations, and adds 
further support to the conclusion that behavioral funds are able to outperform index funds. 
 
Since the majority of studies in the Norwegian market concerns non-behavioral funds, the 
results of this study could be compared to other studies in order to examine any differences 
between behavioral and non-behavioral funds: Tveito (2006) found that three out of 14 found 
were able to outperform the market index. Daphu (2007) found three out of nine funds being 
able to outperform the market index, and Myrmel (2008) found 15 out of 27 funds being able 
to beat the market index. Compared to theses studies, my results indicate that behavioral 
funds are, in a greater extent, able to outperform the market index. 
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TABLE 15: SHARPE'S RATIO 
Ticker	   1993-­‐1998	   Rank	   1999-­‐2004	   Rank	   2005-­‐2010	   Rank	   1993-­‐2010	   Rank	  
OSEFX	   0.1707	   6	   0.0686	   11	   0.1050	   13	   0.1112	   10	  
SKV	   0.2449	   2	   0.1994	   2	   0.1552	   4	   0.1907	   3	  
ODN	   0.2220	   3	   0.1790	   3	   0.1163	   12	   0.1738	   4	  
PAA	   N/A	   	   0.2857	   1	   0.1803	   1	   0.2054	   1	  
DHN	   0.1663	   7	   0.1116	   5	   0.1534	   5	   0.1376	   5	  
PLA	   0.0464	   11	   0.0770	   9	   0.1464	   6	   0.0984	   13	  
HBN	   N/A	   	   0.0706	   10	   0.1728	   2	   0.1235	   7	  
STBN	   0.1894	   5	   0.0542	   13	   0.1353	   8	   0.1234	   8	  
DNBN	   0.1401	   8	   0.0678	   12	   0.1338	   9	   0.1127	   9	  
PI	   0.0764	   10	   0.1006	   6	   0.1241	   10	   0.1026	   12	  
CNI	   0.1194	   9	   0.0832	   8	   0.1216	   11	   0.1088	   11	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.1981	   4	   0.0872	   7	   0.1389	   7	   0.1373	   6	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.3062	   1	   0.1577	   4	   0.1588	   3	   0.2071	   2	  
Table 15 displays the results from calculating Sharpe Ratio for all funds over the different 
time periods. 
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6.6 INFORMATION RATIO 
Table 16 and 17 contains the calculations of Information ratio for all time periods using 
CAPM and the Carhart four-factor model. 
As presented in section 2.6.4 Information Ratio is used to test the fund managers’ ability to 
create excess return above the benchmark, and can also be used to test persistence in 
performance. The application of information ratio in this study is to test how the behavioral 
funds perform relative to index funds, matching funds and further compare the equally 
weighted portfolios. 
Table 13 displays the results of the calculations using the CAPM. Over total time-period all of 
the funds have positive IR. Best ranked are Skagen Vekst and Pareto Aksje with respectively 
information ratio of 0.2213 and 0.2077. All of the behavioral funds rank higher than the 
matching funds (STBN and DNBN), the index funds (PI and CNI). This is in line with the 
finds of Reinhart and Brennan (2007) and Wright et al. (2006) 
The equally weighted portfolio consisting of behavioral funds has the highest rank in two out 
of three periods, and thus ranks as number one over the total time period. This could be a 
result of the low tracking error. The equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds is 
ranked as number seven, outperforming PLA, the matching fund and the index funds.  
Even though the behavioral funds are ranked higher than the matching funds, index funds and 
the equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds, there seems to be more variability in 
their performance. Both SKV and ODN are ranked high, second and third, in the two first 
periods, but are ranked 11 and 12 in the last period.  This could be an indication of funds 
performing better than the benchmark in economical stabile times, relative to time periods 
with high volatility. However, it is worth mentioning that some funds with good prior 
performance are able to outperform the market also in turbulent times, like PAA and DHN. 
The findings are in line with prior studies. Both Tveito (2006) and Grønsund and Lunde 
(2010) find both negative and positive information ratios, but slightly more on the positive 
side..(Grønsund & Lunde, 2010; Liew & Vassalou, 2000; Tveito, 2006) 
Table 14 displays the results of  calculating the Information ratio using the Carhart four-factor 
model. Comparing the results using Carhart and CAPM display some differences: The 
absolute values of information ratio are lower, indicating that the Carhart model captures 
more of the variability in stock prices, reducing the alpha. The most noticeable change is Odin 
Norge. Being ranked as the fourth best fund using CAPM, the fund is only rank as number 
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eight under the Carhart regression. This could be a result of significant loading on the HML 
factor, which is not captured under the CAPM, reducing the alpha. Another change is the 
ranking of index fund PLUSS Index. For this fund, the ranking has changed from 10 to seven, 
indicating better performance when using the Carhart four-factor model.  
Examining the sub-period reveals only small differences between the ranking using the 
CAPM and the Carhart four-factor model. However, as the ranking changes for almost all 
funds from time period to time period, using prior performance as an indicator for future 
performance is not recommend.  
 
TABLE 16: INFORMATION RATIO, CAPM 
Ticker	   1993-­‐1999	   Rank	   1999-­‐2005	   Rank	   2005-­‐2010	   Rank	   1993-­‐2010	   Rank	  
SKV	   0.2933	   1	   0.3097	   2	   0.1302	   5	   0.2213	   2	  
ODN	   0.1445	   3	   0.2516	   4	   0.0519	   12	   0.1446	   4	  
PAA	   N/A	   	   0.3235	   1	   0.1628	   1	   0.2077	   3	  
DHN	   0.1413	   4	   0.1065	   7	   0.1257	   6	   0.1131	   6	  
PLA	   0.1080	   5	   0.0369	   10	   0.1345	   4	   0.0807	   8	  
HBN	   N/A	   	   0.1524	   5	   0.1622	   2	   0.1265	   5	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
STBN	   0.0822	   7	   -­‐0.0486	   12	   0.0997	   8	   0.0543	   9	  
DNBN	   -­‐0.0710	   8	   0.0050	   11	   0.0921	   9	   0.0238	   11	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
PI	   -­‐0.0724	   9	   0.1232	   6	   0.0679	   10	   0.0463	   10	  
CNI	   -­‐0.1409	   10	   0.0633	   9	   0.0620	   11	   0.0137	   12	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.1057	   6	   0.0744	   8	   0.1070	   7	   0.0918	   7	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.2910	   2	   0.2672	   3	   0.1419	   3	   0.2251	   1	  
The table displays the results from calculating information ratio on all of the funds in the sample using 
the CAPM. 
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TABLE 17: INFORMATION RATIO, CARHART FOUR-FACTOR MODEL 
Ticker	   1993-­‐1999	   Rank	   1999-­‐2005	   Rank	   2005-­‐2010	   Rank	   1993-­‐2010	   Rank	  
SKV	   0.2756	   1	   0.3313	   1	   0.1303	   3	   0.1964	   1	  
ODN	   0.1116	   4	   0.1850	   4	   0.0353	   11	   0.0438	   8	  
PAA	   	   	   0.1845	   5	   0.1523	   1	   0.1699	   2	  
DHN	   0.1479	   3	   0.1468	   8	   0.0784	   7	   0.0587	   6	  
PLA	   0.0655	   7	   0.0741	   11	   0.1170	   5	   0.0707	   5	  
HBN	   	   	   0.1837	   6	   0.1425	   2	   0.1195	   4	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
STBN	   0.0883	   6	   0.0284	   12	   0.0770	   8	   0.0113	   11	  
DNBN	   -­‐0.0899	   9	   0.0968	   10	   0.0564	   9	   0.0066	   12	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
PI	   -­‐0.0709	   8	   0.2023	   3	   0.0430	   10	   0.0462	   7	  
CNI	   -­‐0.1052	   10	   0.1543	   7	   0.0339	   12	   0.0260	   10	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ew	  Cf	   0.0959	   5	   0.1381	   9	   0.0798	   6	   0.0346	   9	  
Ew	  Bf	   0.2638	   2	   0.2776	   2	   0.1207	   4	   0.1276	   3	  
The table displays the results from calculating information ratio on all of the funds in the sample using 
the Carhart four-factor model. 
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6.7 CRITICAL REMARKS 
In order to recognize behavioral mutual funds in the Norwegian market, the funds are 
categorized based on the written statement in which the fund manager induces to utilize 
“behavioral finance” to make investment decisions. Six mutual funds are identified by reading 
the prospectuses of the funds, and the investment philosophy of the funds management 
company. This form of selection involved a lot of subjectivity and may have affected the 
results due to selection bias. The problem of categorizing funds as behavioral is also mention 
in the studies of Reinhardt and Brennan (2007) and Wright et al. (2006). One particular 
problem when categorizing funds, was the case value investing. As described in section 4.2 
value investing may be considered both a rational and a behavioral strategy. This implies that 
different fund managers might have different interpretations of value investing.  
The dataset is not tested for the assumptions of OLS estimations, but several studies of the 
Norwegian fund market have found the market to be free of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (Gjerde & Sættem, 1991; Grønsund & Lunde, 2010; Tveito, 2006). 
However, having not proven the dataset fulfilling the requirements of the OLS estimation, the 
results must be analyzed with a bit caution.  
Using two different models leads to two different results when testing for abnormal 
performance. As the model of Carhart (1997) is an extended version of the CAPM, I find it 
more relevant to use the result of this model. The CAPM has also been found to be imprecise 
and outdated (Montier, 2002). Using R2 as a measurement of the fit reveals that the model of 
Carhart describes more of the variability in fund performance through the independent 
variables, hence, it is a better model when evaluating fund performance. 
Further studies on funds with a behavioral strategy may consider interviewing fund managers 
to better assure that the funds are actually using behavioral finance in their strategy. Another 
approach could be to use a survey among fund managers in order to categorize funds as either 
behavioral, conventional or index funds. It could also be interesting to sort all active managed 
funds according to their loadings on the different factor portfolios. The result could be used to 
discuss whether the factor loadings are a result of accepting the risk related to the cross-
sectional returns, or a result of buying into the behavioral explanation. 
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7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the development of behavioral finance as an alternative theory to the efficient market 
hypothesis, more and more mutual funds seem to incorporate some sort of filter to capture the 
effect of irrational traders in the market. Even though behavioral finance has gathered 
substantial attention in academia, the practical application is still not fully accepted.  
Only a few studies have shown interest in the emergence of fund trying to capitalize on 
behavioral anomalies in the market, and I therefore found it interesting to analyze the 
performance of Norwegian mutual fund associated with behavioral finance. The objective this 
study was to examine whether “behavioral” mutual funds in the Norwegian market (1) earned 
abnormal returns after controlling for risk and (2) had different factor loading on the Carhart 
four-factor model compared to non-behavioral funds. The behavioral finance funds are 
identified after a comprehensive review of 67 Norwegian mutual funds using their 
prospectuses published on Morningstar, and examining the investment philosophy of the 
funds management company. However, none of the funds in the Norwegian market explicitly 
admits make investments based on behavioral finance, which caused the categorization to be 
difficult. I identified six mutual funds that had the strongest characteristics towards a 
behavioral strategy, and evaluated their performance throughout the period 1993-2010. The 
models applied were Jensen’s Alpha for CAPM and the Carhart four-factor model, Sharpe 
Ratio and Information Ratio. I also examined the factor loading in the Carhart four-factor 
model, in order to find differences between behavioral and non-behavioral funds. 
My expectations were based on prior studies of behavioral finance funds in the US market, 
Wright et al. (2006) and Reinhart and Brennan (2007), that found behavioral funds being able 
to outperform index funds, but not being able to deliver any positive abnormal returns outside 
the risk factors in Carhart (1997) model. 
My empirical results of testing the funds for abnormal performance, using the capital asset 
pricing model, indicated that some behavioral funds were able to deliver abnormal returns. 
Skagen Vekst delivered significant alpha at 1% significant level, and Pareto Aksje Norge and 
Odin Norge delivered abnormal returns at 5% significant level. The result of Skagen Vekst 
supports prior studies, which also have found Skagen Vekst to perform well (Grønsund & 
Lunde, 2010; Hoel, 2010; Tveito, 2006). The results show that behavioral funds were able to 
outperform index fund and conventional funds, in line with the finding of Reinhart and 
Brennan (2007). 
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The result of analyzing the funds performance using the Carhart four-factor model indicated 
that only Skagen Vekst of the behavioral funds were able to deliver significant risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns. All of the other behavioral funds also had positive alpha-values, but the 
result did not hold as statistical significant, indicating that the H1 hypothesis fails to be 
rejected. The conclusion was further supported by the results on the equally weighted 
portfolio of behavioral funds. These results support the findings of Wright et al. (2006). Since 
the model of Carhart captures more of the risk related to portfolios, I consider these results to 
be more robust than the results of the CAPM regression. 
Both Share Ratio and Information Ratio displays that behavioral funds were able to 
outperform index funds. Pareto Aksje Norge (PAA) had the highest Sharpe Ratio, 0.2054, 
followed by Skagen Vekst (SKV) (0.1907) and ODIN Norge (ODN) (0.1738). The worst 
performing fund was PLUSS Aksje (PLA) with a Sharpe Ratio 0.098. The market index had a 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.1112. Information Ratio showed similar results. Best ranked were Skagen 
Vekst and Pareto Aksje with respectively information ratio of 0.2213 and 0.2077. All of the 
behavioral funds ranked higher than the matching funds (STBN and DNBN) and the index 
funds (PI and CNI). The examination of different time intervals also indicates variability in 
the returns, making it difficult for investors to use prior performance as a predictor of future 
performance.  
The results of examining the factor loadings in the Carhart four-factor model indicated that 
behavioral funds are more into value investing than conventional funds. However, according 
to Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) value investing could be categorized 
as a rational and a behavioral strategy. Multiple studies (Barber & Odean, 1998; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) have found psychology matters in the stock market. The results of this study 
indicate that mutual funds are still struggling to find ways to capitalize on behavioral finance. 
(Daphu, 2007) (Montier, 2007, 2009; Schouw-Hansen, 2007; Tyssøy) 
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